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TIME Is NOT ON OUR SIDE: WHY
SPECIOUS CLAIMS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO DELAY POLICE REFORM
EFFORTS
Ayesha Bell Hardaway*
Many view the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 as
the best chance for police departments to make meaningful and lasting
improvements. That legislation provides the federal government with the
authority to investigate and sue local law enforcement agenciesfor engaging in
a patternor practice ofpolicing that violates the rights of individuals. However,
police unions have attempted to intervene in structuralreform litigationdesigned
to remedy unconstitutionalpolicingpractices. Those attempts have largely been
based on employment rights conferred through collective bargaininglaws and
similar employment protections. The unions argue that the terms of consent
decrees crafted to remedy unconstitutionalpolicing impair their interests and
rights as detailed in pre-existing terms of collective bargaining agreements.
Legal scholars have argued that the collective bargainingterms impede police
reform efforts. While courts in some jurisdictions have found that employers
cannot unilaterally change a collective bargaining agreement when
constitutional violations are at issue, courts have not directly addressed the
issues presented when consent decree requirements contradict union contract
terms. The Article seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature by providing an
empirical analysis of all consent decrees since 1997 to evaluate whether they
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had the impact they were intended to have on union contracts. This Article also
argues that the unions do not have a legal right to bargain on issues related to
use-of-force policies andpolice accountability because such issues are outside
the permissiblescope of negotiable issues. Court decisionspermitting unions to
intervene on the basis of specious interests only aid the delay of much-needed
reform efforts. The Article proposes that both state andfederal courts should
apply the managerial-function standard, which removes policy and public
interest issues from collective bargaining, when considering whether unions
have a right to oppose settlement agreements in structural police reform
litigation. The Article also recommends that state and local governments
promulgate ordinances clarifying the scope of public employee collective
bargainingrights and the authority of local officials to make management and
policy decisionsfor police departments.
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INTRODUCTION

Twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was playing with a toy gun a friend had given
him earlier that day.' An observer called 911 to report it, but mentioned that the
gun was "probably fake" and that Rice was "probably a juvenile." 2 Officer
Timothy Loehmann claimed afterward that he told Rice, "show me your hands,"
and shot Rice only when he reached into his waistband instead.3 But a
surveillance video shows a different story.4 Officer Frank Garmback drove the
patrol car "so close to Tamir that it made it difficult" to employ tactics
recommended by the department's use-of-force policies.5 Garmback was
Loehmann's Training Officer. 6 Loehmann shot Rice within two seconds,' a fatal
gunshot wound to Tamir's abdomen.8 A forensic expert said that Tamir did not
have time to remove his hands from his pockets, nor hear the police commands
before he was shot. 9 In short, he had no opportunity to comply with officer
commands. When Tamir's fourteen-year-old sister rushed to his side, the officers
tackled her and handcuffed her.'o Neither Garmback nor Loehmann administered
aid to the young boy bleeding in the snow."
Tamir's killing in November 2014 followed the high-profile killings of three
other unarmed civilians by Cleveland police officers. Just nine days earlier,
Tanisha Anderson-a woman whose family says she was in the midst of a mental
health crisiS1 2-was placed face down on the concrete in handcuffs by officers.' 3
Her death was ruled a homicide. 14 And in November 2012, a full two years before

1. See Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by
Cleveland Police, Then a FatalOne, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/UW5W-

9XBV.
2.

Id.

3. Timothy Loehmann, Statement (Nov. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/N6QU-R795.
4. Video Shows Cleveland Police Officer Fatally Shoot 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice,
YouTUBE (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Z8qNUWekWE. See note
50 below for the number of times this video and the video of the Walter Scott shooting have
been viewed.
5. See Loehmann, supra note 3; Dewan & Oppel, supra note 1.
6. See Loehmann, supra note 3.
7. See Dewan & Oppel, supra note 1; Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Video Shows Cleveland
Officer Shot Boy in 2 Seconds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/3PCQ-7QA6.
8. THOMAS P. GILSON, CUYAHOGA CTY. MED. EXAM'R'S OFF., MEDICAL EXAMINER'S
VERDICT 1 (Dec. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/FXW2-CLCQ.

9. See Michael D. Regan, Expert: Tamir DidNot Reachfor Gun, Countering Officer's
Claims, PBS NEWS HOUR (Dec. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/Y57B-NPUT.
10. See Dewan & Oppel, supra note 1.
11.

Id.

12. See Michelle Dean, 'Black Women Unnamed': How Tanisha Anderson's Bad Day
TurnedInto Her Last, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/99A3-MFGE.
13. See Cory Shaffer, TanishaAnderson Was Restrainedin Prone Position;Death Ruled
Homicide, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/7GUS-TF9L.
I4. See Brandon Blackwell, Medical Examiner Releases Full Autopsy Report on
TanishaAnderson, Woman Killed in ClevelandPoliceAltercation, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 15,
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Tamir and Tanisha's deaths, Malissa Williams and Timothy Russell were chased
by Cleveland police for more than 20 miles into East Cleveland." They were
trapped in a dead-end parking lot and killed by a barrage of approximately 139
bullets.' 6 Contrary to police radio transmissions that shots had been fired at a
Cleveland police officer by the occupants of their car, no weapon was ever
recovered.' 7 Nor was there any scientific conclusion as to whether or not
8
Timothy or Malissa had in fact fired a gun that night.' The Ohio Attorney
General blamed "systemic failures" within the Cleveland Division of Police for
9
the events leading up to the deadly shooting.'
A few years earlier, impacted communities raised concerns around the
20
John T.
amount and type of force used by officers in Seattle, Washington.
Williams, a Native American woodcarver, was shot four times "during daylight
hours" by an officer.21 Officer Ian Birk chose to use deadly force against Mr.
Williams less than five seconds after issuing a command to "put the knife down"
22
while Mr. Williams was facing away from him. It was later disclosed that the
23
pocketknife carried by Mr. Williams was legal to have in public. Eyewitness

2015), https://perma.cc/2WUQ-6AJA.
15. See Crimesider Staff, 5 Cleveland Officers Re-Instated After Deadly 2012 Chase,
Gunfire Barrage,CBS NEWS (Oct. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/CAV8-WVXQ.
16.

See OHIO BUREAU OF CRIM. IDENTIFICATION & INVESTIGATION,

PROSECUTOR'S

SUMMARY 5-7 (Feb. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/L4KE-CHSK.
17. Id. at 11, 41 (stating that interviewed officers all heard radio transmissions alleging
suspects fired a weapon at officers, but no firearms or casings were found in subject vehicle).
18. Id. at 7.
19.
See Ohio Att'y Gen. Mike DeWine, Statement as Prepared, Officer-Involved

Shooting

of

Timothy

Russell

and

Malissa

Williams

19-20

(Feb.

5,

2013),

https://perma.cc/Q32P-JWYQ.
20. See ACLU OF WASHINGTON, LETTER TO UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION RE: REQUEST TO INVESTIGATE PATTERN OR PRACTICE OF MISCONDUCT

BY SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT (Dec. 3, 2010), https://perma.cc/QZL7-MKCR. Thirty-four
community and civil rights organizations signed onto the letter. Id
21. Jim Kershner, Seattle Police Officer Ian Birk Fatally Shoots Native American
Woodcarver John T Williams on a Downtown Seattle Sidewalk, on August 30, 2010,

HISTORYLINK.ORG (Jan. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/99NJ-U5BT; Levi Pulkkinen & Casey
McNerthney, No Charges in Woodcarver Shooting by Seattle Police Officer, SEATTLEPICOM
(Feb. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/NE33-TQW6.
22. See Years After Police Shooting, Woodcarver's Brother Remembers the Man He
Lost, NPR (Oct. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/JD37-5CYS; see also Steve Miletich et al., Seattle
Cops Sue Over Department of Justice Reforms, SEATTLE TIMES (May 28, 2014),
https://perma.cc/YRL8-WB4N.
23. See Lynda V. Mapes, Carver'sDeath a Violent End to a Tormented Life, SEATTLE
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), https://perma.cc/MIK7X-K8KL (describing the pocketknife as "a legal

knife with a 3 inch blade"). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.270(1) (1994) (stating that the

unlawfulness of openly carrying knives and other weapons hinges not only on the ability of
the item to cause bodily harm but also on whether they are being carried in a manner that
"manifests an intent to intimidate another" or create a safety concern). But see Casey
McNerthney, Family: Man Shot by Police Was Deaf in Left Ear, SEATTLEPI.COM (Aug. 31,
2010), https://perma.cc/6VSZ-NG8C.
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accounts differed in critical ways from the information provided by Officer Birk.
Contrary to Birk's statements and report, Mr. Thompson had not acted in an
aggressive or threatening manner.24 Other officers in Seattle were captured on
video brutally kicking, punching, and verbally attacking juveniles and nonwhites in ways that sparked outrage among the local community.25
Public outcries for accountability prompted investigations by the
Department of Justice in both cities. 26 Reformers have looked to the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199427 as the best option available
for police departments to make meaningful and lasting improvements.2 8 The Act
provides the federal government with the authority to investigate and sue local
law enforcement agencies for engaging in a pattern or practice of policing that

24. See Steve Miletich & Jennifer Sullivan, Officer Birk Quits After SPD Rebuke,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), https://perma.cc/3K46-HGCJ.
25.

See, e.g., Seattle Girl Speaks About Police Beating, NEWSONE (Mar. 2, 2009),

https://newsone.com/123971/seattle-police-beat-15-year-old-girl; Seattle Cop Punches Teen
in Face; Seen on Video, CBSNEWS (June 16, 2010), https://perma.cc/Y4MC-2WMC; Andrea
Nill Sanchez, Seattle Police Officer Taped Kicking Latino Man in the Head, Pledgingto 'Beat
the Mexican Piss' Out of Him, THINK PROGRESS (May 11, 2010), https://perma.cc/4M85LL5Z; Steve Miletich, SPD Officer Charged With Assault in Videotaped Kicking, SEATTLE
TIMES (June 6, 2011), https://perma.cc/VHA3-9B WV.
26. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div. & U.S. ATr'Y's OFF. N. DIST. OHIO,
INVESTIGATION
OF THE
CLEVELAND DIVISION
OF POLICE
1
(Dec.
4,
2014),

https://perma.cc/984V-8FAR; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div. & U.S. ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE OF W. DIST. OF WASH., INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (Dec.

16, 2011), https://perma.cc/GH94-HBPS.
27. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141). The Act contained numerous other
provisions beyond police reform, such as an assault weapons ban, "three strikes and you're
out," and "dozens of death penalty offenses." Bill McCollum, The Struggle for Effective AntiCrime Legislation-An Analysis of the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994,

20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 561, 561 (1994). The legislation also contained many sections and

&

provisions designed to demonstrate the American government's tough on crime stance. It
simultaneously provided funding to states to incentivize the growth of police departments,
lengthened federal criminal sentences, and provided funding to states to build more prisons.
See Michelle Alexander, Why Hillary Clinton Doesn't Deserve the Black Vote: From the
Crime Bill to Welfare Reform, Policies Bill Clinton Enacted-and Hillary Clinton
Supported-Decimated Black America, NATION (Feb. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/3E5J6X2K; But see German Lopez, The Clinton-Backed 1994 Crime Law Had Many Flaws. But It
Didn't Create Mass Incarceration,Vox (Apr. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/KJ56-Q9JD.
28. Police Reform's Best Tool: A Federal Consent Decree, THE CRIME REPORT (July
15, 2014), https://perma.cc/A5E3-3LGV; John Worrall, Data Show Consent Degrees Worth
Their Cost, BALT. SUN (June 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/WN78-DR2C (explaining that the
cost of consent decrees is worth the expense in the long run); Joshua M. Chanin, On the
Implementation of Pattern or PracticePolice Reform, 15 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L.
SoC'Y, no. 3. Dec. 6, 2014, at 39, https://perma.cc/6X99-NHZ5. Rachel A. Harmon,
Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2009)
(acknowledging the progress made through passage of Violent Crime Control legislation and
arguing that the Department of Justice take a more proactive approach to reforming police
departments); Samuel Walker, InstitutionalizingPolice Accountability Reforms: The Problem

ofMaking Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. Louis PUB. L. REV. 57, 63, 74-75 (2013) (providing
definition and explanation of the scope of accountability in policing).
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violates the constitutional rights of individuals. Investigations by the Department
of Justice into police practices from 2010 to 2016 led to a record number of
29
reform efforts in American cities. The reform efforts generally require police
30
departments to revise or update their policies and training. Those reform efforts
are aimed at creating use-of-force policies that comport with Fourth Amendment
standards, increasing a city's ability to hold officers accountable for misconduct,
and improving police-community relations. 31
Unions and other large groups of law enforcement officers, however,
32
challenge the implementation of specific reform efforts in various ways. in
33
Seattle, after public protests and demands for reform led to a consent decree, a

29.
PATTERN

See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION'S
AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT
19 (Jan. 2017),

https://perma.cc/BLP2-52SW.
30. Id. at 30.
31. Consent decrees and similar structural police reform remedies often encompass an
array of subject matters aimed at improving police departments. Those subject areas range
from employee assistance, to use of force, and data collection. Not all of them fall under the
category of reform efforts contemplated and highlighted in this Article. That is largely true
because, from this author's viewpoint, not all reform efforts fall outside of the purview of
bargainable rights that affect the wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. By
contrast, as discussed more fully throughout this piece, the three reform initiatives identified
here are such that they fall outside of those terms and issues eligible for negotiation through
collective bargaining. Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE. L.J. 1191, 1206
(2017) (outlining the need to delineate between "bargainable issues" and "policy" when
considering if something should be "managerial prerogative").
32. It is important that the issues raised pertaining to police unions in this Article not be
misconstrued. Policing in America is a unique institution for which there are no real parallels
or comparisons. No other employee, public or private, is empowered to lawfully infringe on
the life and liberty of free citizens in the manner in which law enforcement officers are. Rather
than a blanket indictment of unions, this Article only explores issues related to law
enforcement. While there could be tangential employment discrimination implications that
raise concern, those issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
Several scholars have specifically focused on police unions and the various ways they
serve as roadblocks to reform efforts. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police
Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (2017) (exploring how labor law can impact
organizational change in police unions); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110
MICH. L. REv. 761, 799 (2012) (identifying collective bargaining agreements as deterrents to
the prevention of unconstitutional police practices); Rushin, supra note 31 (analyzing 178
police union contracts to illustrate how they impede accountability efforts); Seth Stoughton,
The IncidentalRegulation ofPolicing,98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2211 (2014) (arguing collective
bargaining agreement provisions related to disciplinary grievances impeded the discipline of
officers). Walker, supra note 28, at 72 (discussing how unions use political leverage to elect
mayors who are more inclined to appoint police chiefs who are not committed to leading
organizations that insist on accountability).
33. A consent decree, in this context, is a judicially approved and monitored settlement
agreement. That agreement comes about after the filing of an action and as a result of
negotiations related to the terms. The settlement agreement does not become a consent decree
unless and until the court presiding over the litigation makes such an order. Black's Law
Dictionary defines 'consent decree' as "[a] court decree that all the parties agree to." Consent
Decree, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The U.S. Supreme Court explored the
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group of over 100 individually named officers filed a lawsuit against Seattle city
officials, command staff, and the court-appointed Independent Monitor over
newly constituted use-of-force policies aimed at reducing incidents of excessive
force. 34 The federal lawsuit sought to persuade the court that the new policies
unnecessarily increased the physical risk officers face; specifically, that the new
policies required officers to disregard their own safety in order to follow the new
use-of-force protocol."
As discussed in greater detail throughout the Article, police unions have
asserted their collective bargaining rights to formally intervene and disrupt
structural reform efforts. 36 Those attempts have been made, in some instances,
even though there was no contradiction between the agreements. 37 Civil
procedure rules permit interested parties to intervene, or be added as a party, in
the litigation when they have a vested interest or right that will be implicated
through the adjudication of the matter. 38 Many courts liberally grant motions to
intervene filed by unions without regard for whether the union has a well-defined
legal interest. 39 Requiring parties to maneuver around the misplaced interests of
police unions serves to only confuse and complicate reform efforts.

contours of consent decrees in Buckhannon Board & CareHome Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't
ofHealth & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001). The majority stated that the nature
of "court-ordered consent decrees create the 'material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties"' though consent decrees do not always require a party to admit liability. Id. at 604
(quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indp. Schl. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, at 792-93
(1989)).
34. Mahoney v. Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1215-17 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
35. Id. at 1218-19. The District Court held, among other things, that the plaintiffs did
not have property or liberty interests at stake that would have required they be included in the
drafting of the new use of force policies. Id. at 1215. The court also held the officers' Second
Amendment right to defend themselves were not implicated by the revised policies. Id.
36. E.g. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 392 (9th Cir. 2002); Order
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Portland Police Association's Motion to Intervene,
United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265-SI, at *1-3 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013) (No.
32); Order Denying Motion to Intervene, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924,
2012 WL 12990388, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug, 31, 2012); Order Denying Motion to Intervene,
United States v. Steubenville, No. 2:97-CV-966, at 1-2 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 23, 1998),
https://perma.cc/GJ5R-GUKP. See also Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft,
185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2001).
37. See, e.g., Order Denying Motion to Intervene, United States v. Steubenville, No.
2:97-CV-966, at 6 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 23, 1998).
38. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
39. 4 LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW § 91.09 (Lexis 2018). In the latter situation, judges
overseeing the litigation have determined that the interests of the intervening party were
sufficiently covered by the terms of the settlement and that one of the two original parties
would adequately represent those interests throughout the implementation of the agreement.
See generally Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 321, 339-40 (1988) (discussing how third party attempts to intervene are not heavily
restricted provided they can show they have "any interest that constitutes liberty or property.");
Vulcan Soc. of Westchester Cty, Inc. v. Fire Dep't. of White Plains, 79 F.R.D. 437, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[Ulnions have an interest within the collective bargaining spectrum").
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Nevertheless, unions have repeatedly attempted to intervene in structural
reform litigation. At their core, these attempts assert that the remedial terms of
the settlement agreements cannot bind an organization that is not a party to the
agreement because doing so unfairly impacts the unions' right to bargain on
40
matters related to the work conditions of members. This Article fills an existing
gap in the literature on police unions and reform efforts by providing a legal
analysis of what constitutes the scope of wages, hours, and other such work
conditions. It also argues that managerial prerogative and public policy
limitations render certain subjects not suitable for negotiations. As a result,
collective bargaining agreements cannot be permitted to obstruct the
implementation of consent decrees aimed at remedying unconstitutional police
practices. Allowing such obstructions to continue specifically undermines the
remedial purposes of § 12601 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 199441 and police reforms generally.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I details the origins and persistent
problem of police violence. Innumerable individuals and communities have been
brutalized by police violence for more than 150 years. Lives are being lost while
delays over specious collective bargaining rights are permitted to occur. Part II
explores the remedial approaches utilized to address the problem, with an
emphasis on the processes of structural reform litigation by which the federal
government and non-governmental plaintiffs have sought to remedy and prevent
unconstitutional policing in local jurisdictions. This Part includes a survey of all
Department of Justice-initiated consent decrees since 1997 to illuminate the
scope and frequency of their interrelatedness with union contracts.
Part III explores the historical origins of police unions. It also highlights
contradictions between collective bargaining agreements and consent decrees, as
well as how courts have analyzed police unions' attempts to intervene in
structural reform litigation. This Part concludes by analyzing instances where
courts have precluded unions from bargaining on use-of-force and discipline
policy provisions. This Article concludes in Part IV by arguing that the
imperative nature of police reform efforts and the mandate of managerial
prerogatives reforms require accountability through disciplinary processes. This
Part offers two solutions: a more detailed and focused application of the right of
intervention standard in structural reform litigation and the promulgation of
legislative provisions that expressly remove the creation or revision of law
enforcement policies related to use of force and accountability from the purview
of collective bargaining. Doing so under the doctrine of public employer

40.

Order Denying Motion to Intervene, United States v. Steubenville, No. 2:97-CV-

966, at 2 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 23, 1998), https://perma.cc/GJ5R-GUKP. But see Jurcisin v.
Cuyahoga Cty Bd. of Elections, 519 N.E.2d 347, 145 (1988) (finding that "a proposed charter
amendment that would establish a police review board to investigate charges of police
misconduct and recommend disciplinary action upon a finding of misconduct" did not conflict
with "wages, hours and other conditions of employment" for bargaining purposes).
41 34 U.S.C. § 12601.
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managerial prerogatives 42 will avoid confusion and loss of valuable time that
ensues when unions assert specious rights in these areas as a form of resistance
to structural reform litigation.
I. THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF POLICE VIOLENCE

Police power in the United States occupies a hallowed space in our society.
The ability of the government to enforce its laws is generally deemed essential
to ensuring compliance with norms and order. 43 Indeed, the nation has long
permitted police powers to take precedence over the rights of individuals,
presumably in the interest of the greater public good.4 4 Some have argued that
proper training and more oversight are suitable means by which to ensure officer
accountability. 45 Racism and racial subjugation, however, are deeply embedded
in the foundation of America and their impact on policing has been extensively
documented.4 6 Thus what has been viewed as the greater public good for the
majority has resulted in the oppression and brutal treatment of the
marginalized. 47 The longstanding misconduct of law enforcement around the
mistreatment of people of color in America as well as the sporadic, less-thancomprehensive attempts by the federal government to address local police abuses
have done nothing to remedy the situation. This Part highlights some of the
recent incidents between police and civilians that have prompted current
concerns around police actions and standards. It also provides a brief account of
the efforts, both historical and present, by the federal government to address
violent police misconduct.

42. A managerial prerogative, also sometimes referred to as a management prerogative,
is a generally recognized legal principle that decisions regarding policy are within the sole
purview of the government and its elected or appointed officials. In jurisdictions where public
workers have the right to unionize, such policy decisions are distinctly different from the topics
related to conditions of employment that are subject to collective bargaining, i.e. wages, hours,
staffing numbers. See Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainableor Negotiable Issues in State
Public Employment LaborRelations, 84 A.L.R.3d 242, at II § 3[a] (2018).
43.

GARY

GERSTLE,

LIBERTY

AND

COERCION:

THE

PARADOX

OF

AMERICAN

GOVERNMENT 55-62 (Princeton Univ. Press 2015).
44. Id.
45. Charles Blain, What Does Actual Police Reform Look Like? More Training and
More Oversight, THE HILL (July 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/6BJL-GJTX. But see Rachel A.
Harmon, PromotingCivil Rights Through ProactivePolicingReform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (2009) (discussing how legal remedies have been insufficient to produce long-lasting
reforms).
46.

See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL

DISORDERS 1-5 (1968); Samuel Walker, The New ParadigmofPolice Accountability: The U.S.
Justice Department "PatternorPractice"Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 910 (2003); Dara Lind, The Ugly History of Racist Policing in America, Vox (July 7, 2016),
https://perma.cc/4D28-FSR8; Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History of Police
Brutality in the U.S., SMITHSONIAN (July 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/KNA7-WTLY.
47. See Walker, supra note 46; Lind, supra note 46.
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A. Public Awareness of Extrajudicial Killings by Officers
Images of police violence against marginalized and vulnerable populations,
disproportionately affecting African Americans,48 have captured media attention
in recent years. Images of a Staten Island officer choking the last breath out of
Eric Garner while other officers stood by and watched were captured on the
cellphone of a bystander; Mr. Garner's final words, "I can't breathe," echoed
from televisions and news radio stations across the country. 49 Likewise, footage
of the extra-judicial killing of Walter Scott as he ran away from Officer Michael
Slager in South Carolina,5 0 and of twelve-year-old Tamir Rices' (in what can
only be described as a drive-by shooting) by Officer Timothy Loehmann in
Cleveland, was aired heavily by media outlets. 52 These images, along with media
coverage of massive protests declaring that Black lives matter in America,
riveted the attention of many across the nation. 53 They seemed to awaken the

48.
An updated database detailing the demographics of individuals shot by police
maintained by The Washington Post is available at https://perma.cc/AHP6-UCJ3; James W.
Buehler, Racial/EthnicDisparitiesin the Use ofLethal Force by U.S. Police, 2010-2014, 107
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 295, 295-96 (2017); Kendra Scott et al., A Social Scientific Approach
toward UnderstandingRacial Disparities in Police Shooting: Datafrom the Department of

Justice, 1980-2000, 73 J. Soc. ISSUES 701, 701-02 (2017); Anthony L. Bui, Matthew M.

Coates & Ellicott C. Matthay, Years of Life Lost Due to Encounters with Law Enforcement in
the USA, 2015-2016, 73 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 715, 716-17 (2018),
https://perma.cc/7UA3-DHQF; Olga Khazan, In One Year, 57,375 Years ofLife Were Lost to
Police Violence, ATLANTIC (May 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/22F3-3ARF.
49. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man's Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue
for Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), https://perma.cc/L4T3-YAZM; Terry Gross, 'I Can't
Breathe'Examines Modern Policing and the Life and Death of Eric Garner, NPR (Oct. 23,
2017), https://perma.cc/F3VV-R9B9.
50. Large Crowd Attends Funeralfor Walter Scott, Man Shot by S.C. Police Officer
Chargedwith Murder, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/3A4U-ZUT6; POST
& COURIER, Walter Scott Shooting, VIMEO.COM (Apr. 7, 2015), https://vimeo.com/124336782

(last visited Dec. 6, 2018) (the video of the Scott shooting on Vimeo has been played 3.9
million times within three years); Video Shows Cleveland Police Officer Fatally Shoot 12Year-Old
Tamir
Rice,
YOuTUBE
(Nov.
26,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Z8qNUWekWE (the Rice shooting has been viewed

1,374,904 times as of December 6, 2018).
51. See Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by
Cleveland Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/UW5W9XBV; Video Shows Cleveland Police Officer Fatally Shoot 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice, supra
note 50; Emma G. Fitzsimmons, 12-Year-Old Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot Him,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), https://perma.cc/3RWZ-W5R7.
52. See Video Shows Cleveland Police Officer Fatally Shoot 12-Year-Old Tamir, supra
note 4. The Rice shooting was also posted on the New York Times website. See Fitzsimmons,
supra note 51. These particular names are lifted up because of the images captured; this Author
acknowledges there are numerous other Black men and women who were brutalized and/or
killed by law enforcement during the same timeframe that were not captured on video. See
MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://perma.cc/SJY7-GL9X (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
53. See Benjamin Mueller & Ashley Southall, 25,000 March in New York to Protest
Police Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), https://perma.cc/PE8G-6R6W; Diantha Parker,
Protests Around the Country Mark the Moment of Ferguson Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,
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collective consciousness of many in both majority and marginalized
communities, even though many generations of Americans have known the
reality and impact of police violence.
Police brutality, or use of excessive force, is not a contemporary
phenomenon born out of a lack of compliance with officer demands. Instead,
central to the issue is local governments' inability to ensure their police
departments provide services while protecting the rights of all individuals as
guaranteed by the Constitution. The increased availability of video footage
capturing the actions and decisions of officers during encounters with civilians
highlight the need for effective and sustainable reforms. Similarly, heightened
attention to the rising costs of settlement, judgment, and associated litigation paid
by municipalities has prompted many to ask government and elected officials
what is being done to address these ongoing abuses.
More civilians have begun to ask what should be expected and required of
police power. These questions largely center on the appropriate use of deadly
force, 54 the best way to ensure impartial and effective internal police
investigations,55 and whether officers are fairly held accountable for abuses.56
The numerous instances of police misconduct across the country highlight the
fact that reliance on judicial remedies to address constitutional abuses relating to
police misconduct has not been sufficient. Members of the general public are
not alone in their concern. Legal scholars and policing experts have offered
insight on how municipalities can best train officers on methods and techniques
that do not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of civilians.58 It
is essential that supervision of law enforcement personnel include the ability to
effectively implement accountability mechanisms. 59 Experts have argued that
2014), https://perma.cc/F5EC-6QHQ; Leanne Suter, Protestors Speak Out Against Police
Brutality in Downtown Los Angeles, ABC (Oct. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/JP4A-TMZB.
54. Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation,
Pre-Seizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REv. 629, 638 (2018) ("We
want police officers to exercise appropriate care and caution before using deadly force ...
[re]forming the law in a way that encourages the use of deadly force only when it is
proportionate and necessary .... ).
55. Walker, supra note 46, at 3, 6-7, 22.
56. Id. at 6-7.
57. Harmon, supra note 45, at 9 (describing the inadequate and ineffective nature of
criminal and civil remedies available to redress and deter police abuses); MAPPING POLICE
VIOLENCE, supra note 52 (highlighting the numerous instances of police violence); Samuel
Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police
Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LouIs PUB. L. REv. 57, 60-63 (2013) (discussing several reform
initiatives throughout history that have failed to have a long-lasting effect).
58.

POLICE EXECUTIVE

RESEARCH

FORUM,

CONSTITUTIONAL

POLICING

AS

A

CORNERSTONE OF COMMUNITY POLICING 2-12 (Apr. 2015), https://perma.cc/7BXB-BGAF

(discussing the various training needs, including those centered on the impact of race on
policing, and how the appropriate training is essential to the delivery of constitutional
policing).
59. See Samuel Walker, PoliceAccountability: CurrentIssues and Research Needs, 12, National Institute of Justice Police Planning Research Workshop (Nov. 28-29, 2006).
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repeated occurrences of constitutional violations are connected to lapses in
60
accountability policies and tactical training. A department must investigate
61
potential instances of misconduct in a timely manner.
B.

Police Violence Against Blacks After the Civil War and the Legislation
Created to Address It

Throughout American history, the particular violence unleashed by law
enforcement against Blacks was often closely connected to attempts by
individuals to assert rights conferred upon them by the federal government.
Family members and leaders from marginalized communities have consistently
sought to end police brutality since the Reconstruction period following the end
62
of formal chattel slavery in America.
Historical records indicate that during Reconstruction local police in
Memphis and New Orleans instigated and assisted seething white mobs in
63
murderous attacks on Black communities. Historians have cited hostility from
Memphis police officers towards freed Blacks serving in the U.S. military before
and after the Civil War and bitterness between "low whites and blacks" as causes
of the deadly 1866 riots in that city. 64 Violent beatings, murders, and rapes led
by mobs primarily composed of police and firemen against Blacks in the area
lasted three days.6 5 Early documented accounts of the carnage estimated that
angry mobs of white police officers and their supporters killed more than thirty
Black men, women, and children, injured fifty, and caused more than $120,000
worth of property damage. 66 The lone police officer killed during the riots
67
accidentally shot himself with his own weapon.
Later that summer, Freedmen sought to secure their right to vote in New

60. See Walker, supra note 46, at 25, 28-29; Walker, supra note 57, at 84 (discussing
how training and policy revisions create significant organizational and cultural change within
police departments).
61. Walker, supra note 46, at 34.
Government-sanctioned brutality against Black individuals in fact existed even
62.
before Reconstruction in the form of slave patrols, but obviously slaves had no rights as
humans, much less citizens. "Slave patrols were vested with virtually unlimited coercive
[and] could and did enter slave homes with impunity."
to monitor slaves ...
authority ...
Sandra Bass, Policing Space, PolicingRace, 28 Soc. JUST., no. 1, Spring 2001, 156, 159.
63. A
Visual
Timeline
of Reconstruction:
1863-1877,
DIGITALHISTORY,
https://perma.cc/LB5M-4E9E
(archived Jan.
16, 2019). See also ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 261-63 (1st ed. 1984).
64. CHARLES F. JOHNSON & T.W. GILBRETH, THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU REPORT ON THE

MEMPHIS RACE RIOTS OF 1866 (May 22, 1866), https://perma.cc/2LAH-MY4N.
65. FONER, supra note 63, at 262.
66. See JOHNSON & GILBRETH, supra note 64.
67. Id.
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Orleans. 68 Those efforts were met with unyielding and barbaric violence. 69 The
New Orleans police was comprised largely of ex-Confederate soldiers. 70 Those
officers were angry at the Confederacy's defeat and determined to prevent Black
delegates participating in the Louisiana Convention.7 1 In the name of preserving
law and order, the officers and other Confederate sympathizers attacked unarmed
Blacks at the convention site. Over the course of the day, nearly 50 Black men
died and over 200 others were injured.7 2 Federal troops arrived later that day and
the killing ceased.73
The 42d Congress took up the issue of equal protection for African
Americans with the passage of the Second Enforcement Act of 1871, also
referred to as the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or the Ku Klux Klan Act. It is now
commonly referred to as § 1983. 74 The Court in Monroe v. Pape identified one
aim of § 1983 to be "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice." That consideration was the
result of communication from President Grant to the members of Congress
regarding the unchecked dangers posed to the lives of individuals in some states
within the recently constituted Union:
That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I
do not doubt; That the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within
the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear.
Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of
Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement
of law in all parts of the United States. 76
President Grant's comments can be read as absolving state authorities of any

Black delegates were "mostly" unarmed and barricaded in the convention site at

68.

Mechanics

Institute.

New

Orleans

Massacre

(1866),

BLACKPAST.ORG,

https://perma.cc/H6NE-Q4HfF (archived Jan. 16, 2019). Witness accounts told of Black men
surrendering, waving white flags, and pleading for their lives only to be summarily executed
by white officers. There were also reports of Black men being chased down while gravely
injured and killed. One such beating was described as "[a] policeman took a club and beat his
brains out." Calvin Schermerhorn, When 'Taking Our Country Back' Led to a Massacre,
DAILY BEAST (July 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/E6CK-55TF. See also FONER, supra note 63,
at 252-63; 300 Unique New Orleans Moments: Mechanics Institute the Center of 1866 Riot,
ADVOCATE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/F25D-ASAW.
69. Schermerhorn, supranote 68.
70. FONER, supra note 63, at 263; Schermerhorn, supra note 68.
71. Schermerhorn, supranote 68.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74.
17 Stat. 13; STEPHEN H. STEINGLASS, § 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS §2:2
(2018); see also Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA.

L. REV. 1773, 1780 (2016).
75. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).
76.

Id. at 173.
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willful neglect and instead implying they were powerless to end the violence
against African Americans within their jurisdictions. The remarks from the
legislative floor indicate that law enforcement in some states had refused to
77
provide legal protection and remedy to those who sympathized with the Union.
It is generally accepted that the legislation was a federal response to lawlessness
across the South, and to the local authorities' disregard of, and general
78
§ 1983 was originally aimed at
permissiveness toward, this lawlessness.
addressing private conduct of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and similar groups, while
prior Reconstruction Acts addressed official abuses and discrimination toward
Blacks. 79 It authorized the President "to use the military to protect federal rights"
80
Both civil
and gave him "temporary power to suspend habeus [sic] corpus."
and criminal remedies were available.' Congress removed an amendment to the
bill that would have placed an affirmative duty on state and local governments
82
to prevent violence perpetrated by private citizens and organizations.
Section 1 of the Second Enforcement Act of 1871 also contained more
commonly known language creating civil liability for those who act "under color
83
of authority of state law" while violating the rights of another. That language
survived the demise of other Reconstruction Acts eventually repealed by
Congress and lived on to become 42 U.S.C. § 1983.84 This law provides for
monetary remuneration to individuals harmed by officials operating under the
color of law. 8 ' Though plaintiffs now have a substantive right to be compensated
for violations they suffered, individual-plaintiff litigation and the concomitant
awards of money damages appear to have little impact on reports of widespread
86
police misconduct.

77. But it is a fact, asserted in the report, that of the hundreds of outrages committed
upon loyal people through the agency of this Ku Klux organization not one has been punished.
This defect in the administration of the laws does not extend to other cases. Vigorously enough
are the laws enforced against Union people. They only fail in efficiency when a man of known
Union sentiments, white or black, invokes their aid. Then Justice closes the door of her
temples." Id. at 178.
78. STEINGLASS, supra note 74.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Harry A. Blackmun, § 1983 and Federal ProtectionofIndividual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
82. See STEINGLASS, supra note 74.
83. See Blackmun, supra note 81, at 6.
84. Id. at 10.
42 U.S.C. § 1983; SARGENT SHRIVER NAT'L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, FEDERAL
85.
PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS, Chapter 9.1.A., https://perma.cc/8RC2-

U67B.
86. See Harmon, supra note 45, at 9 (discussing the inadequacies of § 1983§ 1983 and
the exclusionary rule to create institutional change); Stephen Rushin, FederalEnforcement of

Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 3189, 3190-91 (2014) (recognizing existing remedies,
including civil litigation, have been inefficient at reducing police misconduct).

June 2019]

TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE

151

C. The Need for the Creation of the Federal Civil Rights Commission
The Civil Rights Commission, established by the Eisenhower
Administration to investigate the status of racism and discrimination in the
United States and make recommendations regarding the same, revealed the
violence unleashed by law enforcement against Blacks nationwide during the
1950s. The Civil Rights Commission Report of 1961 recounts details of such
violence based on testimony it received during its investigation.87 That testimony
details the attack endured by Theotis Crymes, a military veteran from Alabama,
which included being rammed off the road by a car behind him and subsequently
paralyzed after being shot in the back by the driver of the other car-the local
police chief.88 It also noted how a U.S. Assistant Attorney General found that the
evidence in the murder of Luther Jackson by a Philadelphia, Mississippi police
officer "did not indicate the violation of a federal statute." 89 Despite the passage
of federal laws aimed at remedying discriminatory and brutal police practices,
the federal government declined to pursue additional charges against the officer
after a local jury found him not guilty. 90
National tension around the civil rights movement continued to mount in the
years after the publication of the Commission's first report. Many are aware of
the September 1963 church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama that killed four
young girls.9 1 But the killing of sixteen-year-old Johnny Robinson by a
Birmingham police officer later that day is less well known. 92 Officer Jack Parker
shot Johnny in the back with a shotgun as he and a group of friends ran away
after being harassed by a truck of people hurling racial slurs, waving a
Confederate flag, and throwing bottles. 93 Officers on the scene offered differing
accounts in claiming that the killing was an accident. 94
Johnny's family received no explanation of why the officer shot him. 95 There
were no allegations that Johnny committed a crime, was fleeing the scene of a
crime, or posed a threat to officers or others. Yet, neither a state nor a federal
grand jury issued an indictment for the killing of the young man. 96 Recently, the
Department of Justice pointed to the racial composition of the all-white police
force, the all-white jury, and Johnny's juvenile record to explain why the officer

87.
88.

Mary Frances Berry, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 38-39 (1st ed. 2009).
Id.

89.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., NOTICE TO CLOSE FILE (Apr. 18, 2010),

https://perma.cc/Q29H-UK2X.

90.

Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

91.

See Carrie Johnson, Johnny's Death: The Untold Tragedy in Birmingham, NPR

(Sept. 15, 2010), https://perma.cc/K7PF-SRX7.
92. Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was not charged. 97 Judicial accountability during this era continually proved a
non-existent avenue for securing police accountability and, as a by-product, a
more humane and just form of policing.
D.

Congress Backs Federal Structural Reform Litigation by Passing the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994

'

The federal government's reliance on local government and the judiciary to
address and remedy instances of unconstitutional policing became politically
untenable in 1991.
Congressional hearings exploring issues of police misconduct and
accountability were held in late 1991 after the barbarically heinous beating of
Rodney King.98 In March of that year, Mr. King was beaten with batons,
stomped, kicked, and tased by three patrol officers and a sergeant from the Los
Angeles Police Department following a high-speed chase. The brutal beating was
captured on video, broadcast by news stations, and shocked many across the
nation. 99 Yet, despite the denunciation of the officers' conduct and the evidence
portraying the acts of the officers, a state trial resulted in the acquittal of the
defendants.10 0 The defendants were eventually tried in federal court for
criminally violating Mr. King's constitutional rights; that trial resulted in the
conviction of one defendant for use of excessive force and one defendant for
failing to intervene to stop the criminal conduct; the other two officers were
acquitted.' 0
Testimony from policing experts and law enforcement officials was offered
during the congressional hearings to illustrate that the incident that left Mr. King
severely injured was not an isolated occurrence.1 02 The committee heard
testimony regarding police abuses across the country.1 03 The members of the
102d Congress had to "close this gap" in federal law that left the federal
government powerless to institute an action that would protect the constitutional
rights of individuals and prevent local police departments from continued acts of
abuse.'0 Eradicating such instances was the stated goal of the bill proposed in

97.

98.

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-242(I), at 135 (1991).

99. See William L. Solomon, Images of Rebellion: New Coverage of Rodney King, 11
RACE GENDER & CLASS 23, 25-27 (2004).
100. See Seth Mydans, The Police Verdict: Los Angeles PolicemenAcquitted in Taped
Beating, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 30, 1992), https://perma.cc/D84Y-PNJB.
101. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 88 (1996).

102.

H.R. REP. No. 102-242(I), supranote 98, at 135-36.

Id. The legislative history of the Police Accountability Act details conduct of
103.
officers and departments in New York City, Boston, Los Angeles (both the city police
department and county sheriff), Newark, the District of Columbia, and Reynoldsburg, Ohio.

Id.
104.

H.R. REP.No.HR 102-242(I), supra note 98, at 138.
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1991. The effort was unsuccessful. 0 5 It was not until 1994 that a drastically
reduced bill was passed permitting the federal government to enjoin and remedy
patterns or practices of police misconduct rising to constitutional violations.1 06
The explicit aim of § 12601 is to authorize the United States government to
bring civil suits against any government entity to enjoin and remedy any pattern
or practices of unconstitutional policing committed by law enforcement agencies
under the control of the subject municipalities or states.' 0 7
The Attorney General of the United States is empowered to seek "equitable
and declaratory relief' for communities besieged by police misconduct. 0 8 In
order to do so, the Attorney General, through his or her designees, conducts a
full investigation of the police practices and policies of the subject jurisdiction.1 09
Not all investigations result in a lawsuit." 0 But in those instances where the
Department of Justice finds a pattern or practice of police misconduct, the federal
government has the power to file suit. That litigation, should it result in a full
trial on the matter, will determine whether the allegations made by the
Department of Justice are merited and if the local government should be held
judicially liable for the alleged violations. The resolution of the matter via
settlement agreements, or consent decrees, occurs when the parties forgo
litigating the merits of the Department of Justice finding of unconstitutional
policing. The aim of the reform process is to ensure that the subject law
enforcement agency delivers policing in a manner that comports with the rights
conferred by the Constitution to individuals that agency serves.'I Outcome
measures are used throughout the reform process to gauge the success of the
revised trainings, policies, and utilization of additional resources.112
As discussed below, certain consent decrees drafted to remedy and reform
local police practices contain terms aimed at decreasing the impact that
obstructive collective bargaining provisions can have on the process.

105.

Police Accountability Act of 1991, H.R. 2972, 102d Cong. (1991). The bill was

introduced by Congressman Don Edwards (D-10th CA), who was joined by ten of his
colleagues as co-sponsors. The legislation never made it out of committee.
106. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 (2017). For example, the Act introduced "three strikes" and
added death penalty offense, whereas previous legislation featured a crime victims bill of
rights. JoANN O'BRYANT & LISA SEGHETTI, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRIME

CONTROL: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 2-3 (2002), https://perma.cc/L78D-34KS.

107.

34 U.S.C. § 12601.

108. Id.
109. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., supra note 29, at 5-15.
110. Id. at 5-8.
Ill. Conduct of Law
Enforcement Agencies,
U.S.
DEP'T

OF

JUST.,

https://perma.cc/9DAJ-S9UM (archived Jan. 16, 2019). The Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division, Special Litigation Section protects the rights of people who interact with state
or local police and acts when it finds systemic situations in which people's rights are infringed.
112. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIv., supranote 29, at 23-25.
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II. ROUTES To STRUCTUAL REFORM LITIGATION IN POLICING
Various attempts have been made to ensure police departments deliver
services that are free of unnecessary or excessive force. This Part discusses
notable judicial decisions brought by civilians as well as a recent class-action
suit brought in New York regarding the New York Police Department's stopand-frisk practices. This Part concludes with a description of the Department of
Justice's reform efforts through pattern and practice investigations as conferred
upon the federal government by § 12601.
A.

How the U.S. Supreme Court Refused to Address Deadly Police Tactics

Individual citizens' and community organizations' suits against police
departments for alleged police misconduct have been generally rebuffed by
federal courts. In two notable cases, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the ability
4
1 3
of individuals to secure injunctions l and to assert standingll in efforts to
address police misconduct through judicial intervention.
In Rizzo v. Goode, the Berger Court considered an appeal by City of
Philadelphia officials in a matter that initially began as two class-action lawsuits
under § 1983.115 In the first suit, referred to by the lower court as Goode, the
plaintiffs alleged that the constitutional rights of African Americans in
Philadelphia were repeatedly violated by officers without any disciplinary
ramifications, and even under the implicit authorization of supervisors and
elected officials.'16 Plaintiffs in the first suit sought to have certain identified
officers disciplined or fired for their alleged misconduct and to secure an order
requiring the City to create a mechanism by which to effectively handle civilian
complaints." 7 The second suit was filed by the Council of Organizations on

Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsibility (COPPAR); it alleged
systematic discrimination against African Americans and arose from the
treatment of Black Panther members who were allegedly illegally raided,
8
COPPAR
brutally arrested, strip-searched, and held with excessive bail.'
sought to enjoin the conduct of the police department and to have the court
appoint a special master to oversee the implementation of a court-ordered
decree.1 9 The district court found that Philadelphia Police Department had an
113. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376, 378-80 (1976).
114. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 109-10 (1983).
115. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 364-67, 370.
116. Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability & Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F.
Supp. 1289, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1291, 1307.
119. Id. at 1291. It is important to note that plaintiffs in COPPAR did not consider the
establishment of a citizen complaint board alone to be enough to adequately redress the police
misconduct at issue. It was their position that having a process by which to "air" complaints
did nothing to correct misconduct within the department. Instead, the organization sought to
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"unacceptably high number of instances" of unconstitutional conduct, and issued
a consolidated order requiring the City to develop a comprehensive plan that,
among other things, addressed racial bias.1 20
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower court on essentially three
bases.121 First, they found the individual plaintiffs from the initial actions lacked
the requisite case or controversy to justify the lower court's grant of injunctive
relief.1 22 The determination by the Court that the respondents failed to meet the
jurisdictional requirement could have ended the analysis. But it went on to find
that § 1983 could not be used to hold state officials liable for misconduct or civil
rights violations they did not actively or affirmatively promote.1 23 Finally, the
Court held that federalism and equitable restraint principles precluded the
District Court from interfering with police operations through the injunction
process.1 24

By emphasizing the absence of proof that the named defendants actively
committed or promoted misconduct, the Court improperly elided the
responsibility local government officials bear to ensure their police forces adhere
to the Constitution's requirements. The lower court had outlined the duties of
each named defendant as codified by the City of Philadelphia Charter.1 25 That
outline identified each defendant's connection to, and authority over, the police
department and its officers.1 26 Additionally, the Court's § 1983 analysis
illogically undercut the plain reading and purpose of the statutory language,
"[e]very person who, under color of... custom,"l27 which necessarily implicates
governmental policies and procedures. Nothing in the text of the statute or
legislative history supports the Court's requirement that the named defendants
could only be those accused of personally committing the aggrieved misconduct.
In Monell v. DepartmentofSocial Services, the Court held § 1983 to be a suitable
legal avenue to sue local officials in their official capacities where the custom of
local government deprived individuals of constitutional rights.1 28 This
subsequent decision is now routinely used to assert that local government
officials can be held liable for failing to train or correct the conduct of
subordinates that results in constitutional violations; an affirmative departmental

have the federal court establish a process by which to stop Fourth Amendment violations
including illegal searches, arrests, beatings and harassment. See Donald Janson, U.S. CourtIs
Asked to Ban Abuses by PhiladelphiaPolice and Name an Enforcer, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 10,
1971), https://perma.cc/3QPA-K24U.
120. Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability, 357 F. Supp. at 1321.
121. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 362-63.
122. Id. at 363.

123.

Id. at 363, 373-74.

124.
125.
126.

Id. at 379-80.
Council of Orgs. on Phila. PoliceAccountability, 357 F. Supp. at 1292.
Id.

127.
128.

42 U.S.C § 1983 (2017).
436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [XV:137

156

policy that violates one's rights is not required.1 29
After Monell, however, the Court continued to deny injunctive relief to
plaintiffs injured because of unconstitutional police practices.1 30 Adolph Lyons
was strangled until he lost consciousness; his injuries caused him to spit up blood
and dirt and also defecate and urinate on himself following a brief stop by two
Los Angeles police officers for a burned-out taillight.131 It was uncontroverted
that the deadly force used on Mr. Lyons was not in response to him posing a
threat of serious injury or death to officers.' 32 Also uncontroverted was that Los
Angeles Police Department prior policy and practice permitted this use of
disproportionate lethal force.1 33 Mr. Lyons alleged that he suffered several
constitutional violations 34 and sought declaratory, monetary and injunctive
relief for his injuries.1 35 The district court denied Mr. Lyons' § 1983 claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief l 36
The Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Lyons' claims were wholly distinguishable
from O'Shea and Rizzo because the threat of future injury was immediate for Mr.
Lyons and every local citizen due to the fact that the city permitted the use of
strangleholds even when an officer was not in danger, and that the odds of future

129.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (holding that failure to train is

only actionable where it represents a "deliberate indifference"); Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 54, 71 (2011) (holding a single Brady violation that resulted in the wrongful
conviction of Thompson was insufficient to meet the deliberate indifference standard required
to recover damages under § 1983).

130.

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113-14 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

131. Id. at 114-15.
132. "Lyons, stopped for a traffic violation, neither resisted nor threatened the LAPD
officers." Benjamin I. Whipple, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Police Use of
"Pain Compliance" Techniques on Nonviolent Arrestees, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 177, 187

(1991).
133. Lyons v. Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1980).
134. Mr. Lyons alleged that the LAPD violated his First Amendment rights by exacting
prior restraint on his speech, his Fourth Amendment right against unwarranted seizure, his
Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process. See id. at 1244. He alleged that the chokehold was used
against him in a matter of seconds following his complaint about the pain of the rough, strong
arm tactics against him during what should have been a routine traffic stop. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 114-15. In the various court opinions related to Mr. Lyons' case, there is no assertion that
the strangleholds were used in response to a threat posed by Mr. Lyons to officers during the

stop. Lyons, 615 F.2d. 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 1980); Lyons, 656 F.2d 417, 417-18 (9th Cir.
1981); Lyons, 453 U.S. 1308, 1309 (1981); Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 (1983).
135. Lyons, 615 F.2d. at 1244.
136. Id. The district court provided no written findings or conclusions of law. Id. at 1246.
In consideration of the appeal, the Ninth Circuit presupposes that the lower court summarily
dismissed Mr. Lyons' claims for the reasons asserted by the defendants in their Motions for
Summary Judgment. According to the Ninth Circuit, those filings asserted that Mr. Lyons had
not presented a case or controversy qualified to be heard in federal court as required by Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and O'Shea v. Little, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), because he had not
adequately shown that he was likely to suffer "real and immediate future injury." Id
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injury were greater in Lyons due to the high-traffic nature of Los Angeles.1 3 7 The
court, in its remand,1 38 placed great emphasis on the fact that Mr. Lyons was not
requesting broad, sweeping structural relief that required federal court
supervision over a state entity for an extended period of time.1 39 The Ninth
Circuit refused to apply Rizzo and O'Shea to Mr. Lyons's case because, in its
view, doing so would mean the Supreme Court "meant to make it nearly
impossible to challenge unconstitutional police practices." 40 The court aptly
recognized that doing so would "only encourage a disrespect for both the law
and the police who enforce that law."'41
The U.S. Supreme Court heard the merits of Mr. Lyons's case over six years
after his traffic stop and injury.1 42 The Los Angeles Police Department had
caused the death of at least sixteen motorists, twelve of them being Black men,
since 1975.143 Nevertheless, the Court reversed, finding that the past wrongs
committed by officers failed to establish that Mr. Lyons had standing to seek
injunctive or declaratory relief. '4 Relying on a constricted and tortured view of
when a case or controversy is present, the Court opined that the requirement
could only be met if Mr. Lyons could prove that he would be stopped again and
that all LAPD officers always choke all people they encounter "whether for the
purpose of arrest, issuing a citation, or for questioning." 45
Id. at 1246.
138. On remand, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against the City of
Los Angeles in regards to its use of strangleholds when officers are not faced with the threat
of death or serious bodily harm. The order required the LAPD to develop a training program
on the appropriate use of chokeholds; it also required the city to create regular reporting
requirements on the use of strangleholds by officers and provide record keeping to the court
137.

upon request. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 453 U.S. 1308, 1309-10 (1981).
139. Lyons, 615 F.2d at 1246, 1247.
140. Id. at 1250.
141. Id.

142.

Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 (1983). The Supreme Court initially

declined to grant certiorari when the City of Los Angeles appealed the district court's decision
on remand in Lyons 1. 449 U.S. 934 (1980). At that time, three Justices (White, Powell, and
Rehnquist) were in favor of hearing the case because they considered O'Shea and Rizzo to
have made it clear that "federal courts are not the forum in which dissatisfied citizens may air
their disagreements with government policy." Id. at 936 (White, J., dissenting). Following the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Lyons II (where they found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in enjoining the city's use of strangleholds), Justice Rehnquist got a second bite of
the proverbial apple and, in his role as Circuit Justice, issued a stay of the injunction and
permitted the LAPD to resume its use of strangleholds. 453 U.S. at 1308, 1312. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari for Lyons II on February 22, 1982. 455 U.S. 937.
143. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 115-16.
144. Id. at 105.
145. Id. at 105-06. The Court also states that a case or controversy could be established
if Mr. Lyons showed that he would certainly be stopped by the police again and that City
officials authorized or ordered the officers' conduct. They ignored the fact that the city had,
indeed, authorized the unconstitutional conduct. They also showed complete disregard for the
lives of motorists, particularly Black men, by ignoring the concrete data capturing the number
of Black men strangled to death by LAPD during the pendency of the litigation demonstrated
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This incredible standard requires individuals seeking adequate remedy for
the violation of their constitutional rights to meet the impractical and unnecessary
requirement of showing that they personally will be in the same situation with
law enforcement. The Court requires some futuristic, concrete proof to show that
every citizen will be strangled by police during an encounter. It ignores the
wrong created during the initial stop and permits municipalities to have policies
that clearly create unwarranted danger to the lives of civilians. Of equal
importance, it signals to police departments that the federal judiciary will not
serve as a guardian of either the Constitution or the lives the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments aimed to protect. The holding in Lyons amounts to the
majority of the Justices who heard the case refusing to perform their Article III
46
duties. They used a recently-fashioned jurisdictional hurdlel to allow them to
turn a deaf ear to those endangered by unconstitutional police practices.
In Lyons and Rizzo, the Court rejected plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief.
And though the plaintiffs in Rizzo presented the trial court with evidence and
data related to the pervasive misconduct within the Philadelphia Police
Department, the Court held that the district court erred when "it injected itself by
injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs" of a local police
47

department.1
These and other cases involving pervasive police misconduct made clear that
the Court deemed its duty to solely be to make municipalities pay damages for
their unconstitutional practices, and that ordering remedies aimed at reforming
police departments was not within their authority. The repeated dismissive
maligning of injunctive efforts to stop the practices has rendered the Court
complicit in the continued abuses and violations. The passage of § 12601 in 1994
should be seen as an explicit declaration by Congress that widespread violations
of individual constitutional rights merit intervention by the federal government
and its judiciary and any attempts to subvert those efforts should be denied.
At present, there are only two avenues to address systemic police
misconduct. Those two avenues are large-scale class-action suits and
investigations initiated by the Department of Justice. Notwithstanding those
earlier court decisions, federal courts have redressed pervasive unconstitutional
policing outside of § 12601 litigation in recent years. Non-governmental
organizations have assisted plaintiffs in filing suits aimed at reforming police

this likelihood. Id. at 115-16.
146. Id. at 127, 130. Additionally, it is not lost on this Author that both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Lyons identified varying concerns surrounding federalism and the
intrusion of federal courts into the daily activities of large police departments. In many ways,
these concerns implicate the type of federal court supervision required under Section 12601
litigation and consent decrees. However, presuming Section 12601 meets the proportional and
congruent requirements of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the passage of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act has now placed injunctive and equitable relief aimed
at reforming police departments squarely in the lap of the federal judiciary.

147.

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).
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practices.
The Center for Constitutional Rights, along with other counsel, filed a classaction lawsuit against the New York Police Department alleging that the
department conducted routine stops of individuals in a manner that
unconstitutionally targeted Blacks and Hispanics. 148 That initial suit, Daniels v.
City of New York, resulted in a settlement agreement with the city to create an
anti-racial profiling policy, document each stop, conduct community forums, and
perform quarterly audits to update plaintiffs regarding the number of stop and
frisks conducted by officers.1 49 The conditions of the settlement agreement were
mandatory for four years. 5 0 The initiation of the below case was part of the
evolution of stop-and-frisk issues born out of the persistent issues within the New
York Police Department (NYPD) following the audits conducted pursuant to the
Daniels settlement.' 5
More than nine years after the filing of the complaint in Daniels, two
separate plaintiffs filed suit regarding the racial profiling violations committed
by officers on both public and private property. The private suit, Ligon v. City of
New York, was filed in response to the city's deployment of officers outside of
private apartment buildings in the Bronx.' 52 Plaintiffs alleged they were
routinely, and without legal justification, stopped and questioned under the
suspicion of trespass, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Floyd v. City of
New York 53 was the "stop and frisk" case widely covered by the national
media. 154 That class-action suit involved allegations that the NYPD violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of Blacks and Hispanics through their stop and frisk
policy and practices as applied to those individuals on the public streets of New

148.

Daniels v. City ofN.Y, 198 F.R.D. 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). This suit followed

the killing ofAmadou Diallo, an unarmed man, as the result of4l shots fired on him by officers
while he stood in the entranceway of his apartment building. See Daniels, et al. v. the City of
New York, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, https://perma.cc/JNR9-8STC (archived June

3,2019).
149. David Postel, Case Profile: Daniels v. City of New York, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE (Nov. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/B4MZ-Y6RL.
150. Id.
151. For the role of the Daniels litigation and additional information on the evolution of
stop-and-frisk, see Michael D. White, et al., FederalCivilLitigation as an Instrument ofPolice
Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk
Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9 (2016).

152.
153.

925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y 2013).
Floyd v. City of. Y, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

154. See, e.g., Margot Adler, At 'Stop-And-Frisk' Trial, Cops Describe Quota-Driven
NYPD, NPR (Mar. 21, 2013), https://perma.cc/ZV34-5T2G; Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects
New York's Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/DP8AVCPJ; Leroy Downs, We Won Against Stop-and-Frisk, but Policing in New York Needs to
Change, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/RV6S-NMHM; Annette Dickerson, We
Want Our City Back, AMSTERDAM NEWS (Mar. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/SDJ8-PXNK.
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York City.' The federal district court held the city liable in both instances,156
granted the plaintiffs' requests for injunctions, and issued orders designed to
remedy the unconstitutional practices within the department.1 5 7
Class-action litigation initiated and paid for by civil rights organizations,
such as in Daniels, Ligon, and Floyd, has its drawbacks. Large scale, multi-year
litigation requires an enormous amount of resources. The work of such
organizations is far from guaranteed without charitable donations and grant
funding. This type of ad hoc funding makes it unlikely that sustained and lasting
reforms could be made by replicating these class-action suits in other
jurisdictions across the country where police misconduct has been documented.
Reforming the unconstitutional conduct of officers should not be left to the
heroic efforts of a civil rights organization such as the Center for Constitutional
Rights. As discussed in greater detail below, attempts were made by local police
unions to intervene in Floyd following the court's imposition of remedial orders.
Putting aside the need for ad hoc fundraising on a case by case basis, the
federal government's presence and responsibility to uphold the Constitution
places the duty to ensure constitutional policing squarely in their lap. § 12601
codifies that duty.

B.

Reforms and Accountability through

§ 12601

Federal laws have been passed to prohibit state-sanctioned constitutional
59
Voting,1 60 disability,161 and
violations in the areas of education,' housing,
62
Civil rights legislation passed by Congress during and
employment.1
163
immediately after Reconstruction denounced discrimination by state actors.
That legislation was not enough to prompt the Supreme Court to address
persistent police abuses, as made clear by the holdings in Rizzo and Lyons. The
103d Congress passed new legislation designed to address the pervasive patterns
64
or practices of police misconduct that persisted and provide a judicial remedy.1
This subsection proceeds in two parts. First, it details how the Department of
Justice exercises its authority under § 12601. Second, it examines language from
Department of Justice consent decrees to discuss the quantitative impact of
consent decrees on collective bargaining agreements.
Litigation and settlement agreements negotiated between the Department of

155.

Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d. at 658-60.

156.

Id.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 672, 687-88.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (2017).
42 U.S.C. § 3604.
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2017).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27-30 (1866).
42 U.S.C. § 14141.
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Justice and local governments to reform police departments are the typical and
commonly known consent decrees ordered by federal courts. The Department of
Justice, under the authority of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, has conducted investigations into the practices of police
departments across the country.1 65 The result of those investigations have been
memorialized in what is commonly referred to as "findings letters." 66 in
instances where a pattern or practice of police misconduct has been found, those
letters generally contain language referring to the type and manner of
constitutional violations committed as a result of the misconduct.1 67
Pattern or practice investigations conducted by the Department of Justice
generally take three different paths. In the first instance, the Department may
conduct an investigation, find no pattern of constitutional violations, and
conclude that no further action is warranted.1 68 Alternatively, at the conclusion
of its investigation, the Department may identify some relatively discrete issue
that the local department can remedy through use of a "memorandum of
agreement." 69 This type of agreement does not involve oversight by a federal
court.1 70 Finally, the scope and pervasive nature of constitutional violations

revealed by the Department can lead it to conclude that the subject department
has engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct in violation of the U.S.
Constitution and its concomitant federal laws.' 7 ' If so, the Department of Justice
works with the jurisdiction on a reform agreement and-if the jurisdiction does
not agree on needed reforms-litigation is typically initiated through the filing
of a civil complaint in federal court.1 72 When the Department of Justice finds a
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, the subject local jurisdiction is
faced with a decision whether to litigate the merits of those findings or to enter
into a settlement agreement with the federal government regarding the mode and
manner by which the noted unconstitutional practices will be rectified. 173

165.
PATTERN

See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION'S
AND PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK:
1994-PREsENT
3 (Jan. 2017),

https://perma.cc/BLP2-52SW.
166. Id. at 15.
167. See id at 15-16.
168. See id at 15.
169. Id. at 21.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1.
172. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTs DIv., supra note 165, at 18-19 (only six
of out dozens of cases required civil litigation instead of reform agreements).
173. Id. Reform agreements are more common than civil litigation. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., supra note 165, at 18 (highlighting dozens of reform agreements
versus only six involving civil litigation). Some jurisdictions, however, still choose to litigate.
See generally United States v. Johnson, 28 F. Supp. 3d 499 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (granting partial
summary judgment to defendant Sheriff against the United States and its Fourth Amendment
claims regarding alleged unconstitutional traffic stops); United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp.
3d 272 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (finding that the United States failed to meet its burden under U.S.C.

§ 14141).
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Settlement negotiations are undoubtedly contentious and rife with clashing views
as to the scope of the proposed reforms. However, those reforms move from the
category of being proposed reform to "final and binding" once the federal court
assigned to the action approves the terms of the settlement agreement as a
consent decree. That endorsement requires an analysis of the process and
proposed reforms. The court must be satisfied, through the process of a fairness
hearing, "that the agreement is 'fair, adequate, and reasonable' and 'is not illegal,
74
a product of collusion, or against the public interest."" It is at this point that
the parties become bound to the terms of the agreement and those terms are
memorialized in what is commonly referred to as a consent decree.
Once a federal court has determined that the process culminating in the
settlement agreement was fair, the aim and purpose of what now becomes a
consent decree is to rectify the constitutional violations confirmed during the
investigation and findings phases of the § 12601 action. Those remedies are
delineated in the terms of the decree and the successful implementation of those
terms fall under the authority and purview of the federal judiciary.' Arguably,
not all of the terms of the settlement agreements are specifically designed to
remedy constitutional violations. However, those terms pertaining to use of
force, accountability, and improving relations between officers and the
communities they serve are integral to preventing continued unconstitutional
practices.1 76 Revising policies and procedures aimed at increasing accountability
for officer misconduct and improving community police relations are all
hallmark functions of structural reform litigation. The complex and multi-faceted
nature of those efforts require the parties to be committed to a multi-year process.
Motions to intervene and labor-related grievances filed by police unions in an
effort to assert their collective bargaining rights or simply obstruct the process
have delayed reform implementation efforts.
Police unions-on both the local and national levels-have voiced their
concern regarding the intervention of the Department of Justice into local

174. See United States v. Baltimore Police Dep't., 249 F. Supp. 3d 816, 818 (D. Md.
2017) (quoting United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 581 (4th Cir. 1999)).
175. Still yet gaps in empirical studies regarding the effectiveness of reform efforts
initiated by settlement agreements. It remains unclear, however, whether these interventions
have produced the fully desired effect within the subject jurisdictions. Some law enforcement
agencies have continued to be dogged with new waves of complaints related to police
misconduct after the purported successful implementation of all terms of an agreement. The
success of others has not yet been supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, questions
remain-even within the parties of negotiated settlement agreements-regarding the
permissible scope and breadth of reform efforts. Joshua M. Chanin, Examining the
Sustainability of Pattern or Practice Police Misconduct Reform, 18(2) POLICE Q. 163, 185
(2015) (implementation of settlement terms does not "in and of itself guarantee meaningful,
institutionalized change").
176. Samuel Walker, InstitutionalizingPoliceAccountability Reforms: The Problem of
Making Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. Louis PuB. L. REv. 57, 74-78 (2013).
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policing matters.17 7 This concern was largely expressed through union
endorsements for 2016 presidential candidate Donald Trump, who promised to
roll back the use of federal consent decrees and who voiced support for a return
to "law and order" policing.1 78 That mode of policing has been noted as
supportive of aggressive policing tactics that have enormous potential to run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment.1 79 Less than three months into the Trump
administration, United States Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions
III issued a memorandum to all heads of the Department of Justice in support of
expanded police authority. 80 His memo states that "[lI]ocal control and
accountability are necessary for effective local policing," and that "[i]t is not the
responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal law enforcement
agencies."' 8 ' The memorandum goes on to charge Sessions' Deputy and
Associate Attorney Generals to evaluate current Department of Justice practices
and activities-including "existing or contemplated consent decrees" for

177. See Richard P6rez-Peia, Police Unions Hail Trump's Easing of Scrutiny. Local
Officials Worry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/X4BL-X5R4; Ted Goodman,
Three Largest Police Union Endorse Trump in CrucialBattleground State, DAILY CALLER
(Oct. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/H7BD-YHXC. The article discusses the endorsement of the
National Fraternal Order of Police for then-candidate Trump. Id The endorsement came after
Trump criticized President Obama for supposedly politically driven attacks against police
officers. Id. While it is improper to assume one can accurately determine the basis for the
assertion, nineteen pattern and practice reform agreements were negotiated between 2012 and
2016 under President Obama. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div., supra note 165,
at 1; Christian Boone, In Trump Administration, Many Police See an Ally, AJC (Aug. 10,
2017), https://perma.cc/R35C-Y22A.
178. See Eric Heisig, Cleveland Police Union Head Steve Loomis Is Fond of Donald
Trump, and Has Shown It Over the Past Year, CLEVELAND.COM (Apr. 4, 2017),
https://perma.cc/V54X-VHX3; Ted Goodman, supra note 177; Christian Boone, supra note

177.
179. When President Nixon assumed office in 1969, his administration pursued a lawand-order theme, with a focus on riot control and domestic intelligence. Pamela Irving Jackson
and Leo Carrol, Race and the War on Crime, the SociopoliticalDeterminants of Municipal
Police ForceExpenditurein 90 Non-Southern U.S. Cities, 46(3) AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 290,
293 (1981). It has regained popularity in the current political discourse as the type of policing
supported by President Donald J. Trump and his administration. That style of policing has
been described by him as "rough[ing] up" "thugs" while also expressing support for stop-andfrisk policing techniques. See Phillip Bump, Trump's Speech Encouraging Police to be
'Rough,' Annotated, WASH. POST (July 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/L34X-UG46; Maya
Rodan, PresidentTrump Tells Police Officers Not To Be 'Too Nice' with Suspects, TIME (July
28, 2017), https://perma.cc/HZ6K-2R9V; Louis Nelson, Trump Callsfor Nationwide 'Stopand-Frisk'Policy,POLITICO (Sept. 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/68S5-2USW; Aamer Madhani,
Trump Suggests Chicago Police Bring Back ControversialStop-and-Frisk Searches, USA
TODAY (Oct. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/LD3W-5H7H.
See OFFICE OF Arr'Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENT
180.
COMPONENTS AND UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, SUBJECT: SUPPORTING FEDERAL, STATE,

LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAw ENFORCEMENT 1-2 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/954916/download.
181. Id. at 1.
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compliance with the previously stated edicts of the memorandum.1 82 However,
local policing has historically resulted in repeated constitutional violations in
83
some municipalities when left unmonitored and unchecked.'
C.

When Department of Justice Consent Decrees Implicate Collective
Bargaining Terms

Legal scholars have identified collective bargaining provisions that can have
the intended or unintended effect of circumventing accountability and effective
discipline. 184 These contractual barriers exist in numerous departments across the
nation and are essential to understanding the multi-faceted and complex nature
of policing in America. As discussed in greater detail below, reform efforts by
the Department of Justice have not been entirely focused on the terms of union
contracts. This is for a number of reasons. Not all jurisdictions have state laws
permitting collective bargaining by public employees.' 8 5 And for those that do,
not all agreements contain terms obviously detrimental to reform efforts.
Moreover, the timing of union contract negotiations may also factor into the
Department of Justice's decision to implore the local government to change its
posture on certain contract terms. Accordingly, not all consent decrees contain
provisions that identify ways to implement police reforms via changes to CBAs.
86
related to law enforcement
An analysis of twenty-six consent decrees,'

182. Id. at 2.
183. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 13550 (2016) (discussing drawbacks of U.S. decentralization that results in resource disparities
and policing policies built on political preference not community desires because those who
are marginalized have no political power). See also Walker, supra note 176, at 74-78.
184. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 712 (2017) (exploring how labor law can impact organizational change in police unions);
Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem ofPolicing, 110 MICH. L. REv. 761, 799 (2012) (identifying
collective bargaining agreements as deterrents to the prevention of unconstitutional police
practices); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE. L.J. 1191, 1206 (2017)
(analyzing 178 police union contracts to illustrate how they impede accountability efforts);
Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2211
(2014) (arguing in part that collective bargaining agreement provisions related to disciplinary
grievances impede the discipline of officers).
185.

RICHARD C. KEARNEY & PATRICE M. MARESCHAL,

LABOR RELATIONS IN THE

PUBLIC SECTOR 64-66 (CRC Press, 5th ed. 2014).
186. The consent decrees are cited in footnotes 186-90. For these purposes, the analysis
of consent decrees was limited to those instances where the federal government submitted
Findings Letters to the local government and/or filed a complaint against a law enforcement
agency with allegations of pattern or practices of unconstitutional policing in violation of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The decrees were gathered through a review
of databases maintained by the Department of Justice and the University of Michigan. The
review looked at all cases between 1997 and 2018 where the federal and local governments
entered into settlement agreements related to the charges alleged in the complaint. Instances
where the government offered technical assistance and did not file a complaint were not
included in the analysis. Statements of Interests filed by the Department of Justice have also
not been included. Finally, the analysis excludes the terms of Settlement Agreement in United
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conduct pursuant to § 12601 (formerly § 14141), and negotiated between the
Department of Justice and municipal police and sheriffs departments since
1997, serves to illustrate how each agreement is tailored to identify needed
reforms and provide the necessary mechanisms. The earliest decree in this
analysis was entered in February 1997 between the Department of Justice and
the City of Pittsburgh.'87 It is important to note that the Department of Justice
investigation of the Chicago Police Department in 2017 is not included in this
analysis because the federal government abandoned its intervention efforts in
that city.' There have been three settlement agreements negotiated and entered
since 2017. There appears to be an effort on the part of the government to tailor
each agreement to the needs of the locality in question. This narrowly-tailored
approach presumably serves to meet the needs of each individual jurisdiction
while ensuring that an overly centralized myopic approach to policing is not
forced on cities with unique community and policing needs.
Three of the twenty-six decrees analyzed do not address the issue of unions
and collective bargaining rights, as Arizona and North Carolina do not permit
collective bargaining for officers and Missouri officers have limited bargaining
rights.1 89 Another nine of the twenty-six decrees expressly state that the terms of
the agreement are not intended to alter, impact, infringe, or impair the current
collective bargaining rights of officers.1 90 The remaining fourteen settlement

States v. Town of Colorado City due to the fact that the conduct at issue largely pertained to
housing discrimination against individuals who were not members of the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints. The aggrieved individuals received monetary
damages. See Complaint at ¶ 4, United States v. Town of Colorado City, No. 12-8123 (D. Az.
June
21,
2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/18
/coloradocitycomplaint 6-21-12.pdf; Settlement Agreement at 12, United States v. Town of
Colorado City, No. 12-8123 (D. Az. Apr. 18, 2016), https://perma.cc/46NG-6JL9; Verdict at

13-14, United States v. Town of Colorado City, No. 12-8123 (D. Az. Mar. 7, 2016).
187. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
26, 1997), https://perma.cc/T4NW-YL4F.
188. Because the new Department of Justice administration did not seek a consent
decree in Chicago, the Illinois Attorney General initiated an action alleging unconstitutional
policing in the City of Chicago. Press Release, Illinois Attorney General (Aug. 29, 2017),

https://perna.cc/K3CK-CGCQ. The Complaint filed alleged violations of § 1983, the U.S.

Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, and the Illinois Human
Rights Act. See Consent Decree at ¶¶ 3-4, 707, Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/6QMA-PA4X.
189. Settlement Agreement, United States v. Maricopa, No. 2:12-cv-00981 (D. Ariz.
Jul. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/UA7B-MBRY; Consent Decree, United States v. City of

Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/RB3Z-SMWD;
Settlement Agreement, United States v. Alamance County Sheriff Terry Johnson, No. 1:12-

cv-1349 (M.D.N.C. 2016), https://perma.cc/QJ6F-AWW6.
190. See Consent Decree at ¶ 8, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:00-cv11769-GAF-RC (C.D. Cal. Jun. 15, 2001), https://perma.cc/3LUE-KDX3; Consent Decree at

¶ 11, United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 3:08-cv-00158-CVG-RM (D.VI.
Mar. 24, 2009), https://perma.cc/8ZC6-TXUV; Consent Decree United States v. City of
Pittsburgh, supra note 187, at ¶ 7; Consent Decree Between the United States and Prince

George's County at ¶ 8, No. 8:04-cv-00185 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2004), https://perma.cc/A64A-
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agreements address the expectations and responsibilities of the parties
concerning union challenges or collective bargaining negotiations related to the
settlement terms. 191

BEKM; Consent Decree at ¶ 6, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. 97-966 (S.D. Ohio,
Aug. 28, 1997), https://perma.cc/5DZG-4HGD; Consent Judgment Use of Force and Arrest
and Witness Detention at ¶ 9, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-72258 (E.D. Mich. Jun.
12, 2003), https://perma.cc/2VTS-QNPT; Settlement Agreement at ¶ 209, United States v. Los
Angeles, No. 2:15-cv-03174 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/S8EF-X59V;
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF MIAMI
REGARDING THE CITY OF MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT at T I.B.12, (Mar. 10, 2016),

https://perma.cc/8TGU-29CY; Joint Application for Entry of Consent Decree at ¶ 128, United
States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (D.N.J. 1999), https://perma.cc/ZMN2-XJH2. It should be
noted that the Miami Settlement Agreement also provides that if a conflict between the
Agreement and the collective bargaining rights of officers arises, the city will devise a plan to
avoid the decree. The Agreement further provides that the collective bargaining terms control
but the parties will devise alternative "language to address the underlying goal" if the conflict
cannot be avoided. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
THE CITY OF MIAMI REGARDING THE CITY OF MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT at T I.B. 13 (Mar. 10,
2016), https://perma.cc/8TGU-29CY; Consent Decree at TT 497-98, 502, United States v.
Police Department of Baltimore City, No. 1:17-cv-00099 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017),
https://perma.cc/HL96-Y8YF; Settlement Agreement Between the City of Warren and the
United States of America at 22, United States v. City of Warren, 4:12-cv-00086 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 26, 2012), https://perma.cc/U2T3-Y6ST.
191. See Agreement for the Sustainable Reform of the Puerto Rico Police Department
at TT 297-98, United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 3:12-cv-2039 (D.P.R.
2013), https://perma.cc/KC9K-2RHS; Consent Decree at T 497-98, 502, United States v.
Police Department of Baltimore City, No. 1:17-cv-00099 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017),
https://perma.cc/HL96-Y8YF; Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police
Department at ¶¶ 9, 11, 488-89, United States v. City of New Orleans, 2:12-cv-01924 (E.D.
La Jul. 24, 2012), https://perma.cc/2W3U-WDPV; Consent Decree at ¶ 100, United States v.
City of Ville Platte, No. 6:07-cv-00769 (W.D. La. Jun. 11, 2007), https://perma.cc/JB2YTDKL; MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF MISSOULA REGARDING THE MISSOULA POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT at ¶ 65 (May 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/QM9J-QBEG;

Resolution Agreement Among the University of Montana-Missoula,

the United States

Department of Justice, and the United States Department of Education at ¶ 57, No. 10126001
(2013), https://perma.cc/Q3CC-62ZJ; Settlement Agreement at TT 339-40, United States v.
City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-1025 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2014), https://perma.cc/XA2KCFQQ; Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Cleveland at TT 152, 284, 399, No.
1:15-cv-01046-SO (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/P7QC-4CM3; Settlement
Agreement between the United States Dept. of Justice and the Evangeline Parish Sheriffs
Office at 17 (May 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/FF8J-NGE9; Settlement Agreement and
Proposed Order at TT 226-27, 230-31, United States v. Town of East Haven at TT 231-32, No.
3:12-cv-01652-AWT (D. Conn. Nov. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/3QL5-Z3XV; Settlement
Agreement at ¶¶ 5, 154, 188-89, United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265 (D. Or.
Dec. 17, 2012), https://perma.cc/E62S-VW4J; Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order of
Resolution at T 226-27, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-cv-1282 (W.D. Wash. Jul.
27, 2012), https://perma.cc/9WG2-DU5R; Settlement Agreement Between the City of Warren
and the United States of America at 22, United States v. City of Warren, 4:12-cv-0008 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 26, 2012), https://perma.ccIU2T3-Y6ST; Consent Decree at TT 13, 219-20, 222,
United States v. City of Newark, No. 2:16-cv-01731 (D.N.J 2016), https:/perma.cc/LG5VE93E.

TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE

June 2019]

SILENT

Albuquerque
Almanace
Cty
Baltimore
Cleveland
Detroit
East Haven
Evangeline
Ferguson
Los Angeles
City
Los Angeles
County
Maricopa
Miami
Missoula
New Jersey
New Orleans
Newark
Pittsburgh
Portland
Prince
George's

Not Intended
to Alter or
Impair

Only Notify
if Challenged
by Unionl 92

167

If Subject
of
CB,
Notify +
Consult

Only
Notify if
Subject of
CB

Best
Efforts/
Work to
Change
CBA

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XI93

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

County
Puerto Rico

X

Seattle
Steubenville

Univ.
Montana

X
X

X

192. This category specifically includes those Agreements where union challenges were
specifically mentioned in the text. Settlement Agreement at ¶ 100, United States Department
of Justice and the Evangeline Parish Sheriff s Office (May 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/GX9U9GJD; Settlement Agreement Regarding The United States Department of Justice and the City
of Ville Platte, Louisiana at T 98 (May 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/DAL5-J2RC.
193. The consent decree, however, does contain a provision that requires the City of Los
Angeles to renew a negotiation request with the bargaining units to have separate lawyers
represent officers when more than one officer fires their weapon during the same officerinvolved shooting incident. See Consent Decree, supra note 190, at ¶ 60, United States v. City
of Los Angeles (C.D. Cal. Jun. 15, 2001), https://perma.cc/GS4S-KXG3.
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The Settlement Agreement entered into between the federal government and
the City of Miami is particularly worth noting. Paragraph 13 in Section I.B of the
March 2016 agreement details that the collective bargaining agreement controls
where any conflict between the settlement agreement and the associated
95
Only two decrees-Baltimore and
collective bargaining agreement arises.'
Cleveland-contain language indicating a Department of Justice stance that the
terms of the settlement agreement take precedence over conflicting collective
bargaining agreements.1 96 In fact, the Cleveland and Baltimore decrees contain
provisions that depart from the collective bargaining agreements in place at the
time the consent decrees were negotiated. The Baltimore decree uses "best
efforts"' 9 7 language and the Cleveland decree requires the city to "work with the
unions."1 98 There is no explicit mention of the drafters' legal conclusions or
194. It is important to note that the Baltimore and Warren consent decrees take two
positions: 1) that the agreements are not intended to alter the existing collective bargaining
agreements, and 2) that the the respective cities and police departments bear the responsibility
of notifiying, and consulting with, the Department of Justice of any consent decree terms that
become the subject of collective bargaining negotiations. See Consent Decree at TT 497-98,
United States v. Police Department of Baltimore, No. 1:17-cv-00099 (D. Md. 2017),
https://perma.cc/HL96-Y8YF; Settlement Agreement Between the City of Warren and the
United States of America, United States v. City of Warren at TT I.B.9, VII.D.5, 4:12-cv-0008
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2012), https://perma.cc/4KAG-YLHV. There are several provisions
throughout the Warren decree that demonstrate support for the existing terms of collective
bargaining agreements and the use of those terms as the foundational premise for several
reform efforts. Settlement Agreement Between the City of Warren and the United States of
America at ¶¶ 111.5, IV.C.6, V.A.6, V.C.2, VII.A.3, United States v. City of Warren, 4:12-cv0008 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2012), https://perma.cc/4KAG-YLHV.
195. Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City of Miami
Regarding the City of Miami Police Department at ¶ I.B.13 (Mar. 10, 2016),
https://perma.cc/ERS8-AD2Z.
196. See Consent Decree at ¶ 498, United States v. Police Department of Baltimore, No.
1:17-cv-00099-JKB (D. Md. 2017), https://perma.cc/HL96-Y8YF; Settlement Agreement at ¶
399, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046-SO (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015),
https://perma.cc/QU38-CDQP. For the most part it is unclear how the terms related to
collective bargaining vary so much from one decree to the next. This Author has been told off
the record that it depends upon the timing of negotiations and the extent to which the respective
union contract has contributed to the lack of accountability and oversight essential to the
continued practice/provision of constitutional policing.
197. See Consent Decree at¶ 498, United States v. Police Department of Baltimore City,
No. 1:17-cv-00099 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/HL96-Y8YF ("To the extent
any . . collective bargaining provision conflicts with any provision of this Agreement or
impedes its effective implementation, the City and BPD will use its best efforts to advocate to
change the . . . collective bargaining provision(s).").
198. See Settlement Agreement at TT 202, 249, 314, United States v. City of Cleveland,
No. 1:15-cv-01046-SO (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/QU38-CDQP.
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indication whether they intended for the terms of the federally-mandated consent
decree to supersede the collective bargaining agreement provisions.
The majority of consent decrees disavow any infringement on existing
collective bargaining agreements. That has not assuaged the concerns of police
unions and, in at least one instance, of police department leadership. Chief Jerry
McCartney, Steubenville Chief of Police, documented his disapproval of the
decree in that city. 199 His office issued a press release explicitly stating his belief
that the police department must be involved in negotiating the accountability
reforms in that city.2 00 Chief McCartney also expressed disdain that the decree
required his successor to be hired from outside of the Steubenville Police
Department. 20 1 He also criticized the new requirement that Internal Affairs
investigate anonymous complaints under the decree. 202 The reaction of
department leadership in Steubenville highlights that the issues often raised or
informally complained about by police regarding reforms can have little or
nothing to do with collective bargaining rights.
HI. THE RISE OF POLICE UNIONS AND THEIR RESPONSE TO CURRENT REFORM
EFFORTS

Federal intervention into local policing practices typically garners the
interest of the local union, which manifests as intervention in the structural
reform litigation process. That intervention has occurred through formal motions
to intervene and by filing arbitration grievances regarding certain reform
provisions. This section discusses the origins of collective bargaining rights for
police officers and the general principles conferred to public employees in the
right to bargain with the aim of providing a backdrop for the relevant issues that
illustrate the impropriety of union intervention in constitutional reform efforts.
A. Historical Purpose and Contribution
Law enforcement collective bargaining rights are of great value to officers
in jurisdictions providing statutory authority for organizing. Those rights
generally provide officers the ability to appoint representatives charged with
negotiating salary, benefits, and disciplinary due process requirements on behalf
of the entire membership. This current posture is starkly different from the wageand-work conditions experienced by officers during the first half of the twentieth
century. Historians have recognized the oppressive and grueling work conditions
of officers in 1919 as the initial force that eventually led to current public safety

199. See Steubenville Department of Police News Release 2-3 (October 27, 1999).
https://perma.cc/9EH7-QZLB.
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 3.
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personnel organizing. 203 The officers in Boston were not immune to the
economic hardship that befell our nation and had been forced to work for a less
2 04
Their demand for
than livable wage for more than seventy hours each week.
better earnings and fewer hours were ignored by the police department and local
government. Eventually, several of the officers organized a strike and massive
205
Calvin Coolidge, then
riots wrecked the city each night for three days.
206
governor of Massachusetts, dispatched the State Guard to restore order.
Opposition to public employees organizing was historically rooted in the
belief that the government-as a sovereign body-could not be made to
2 07
Local leaders enacted prohibitions specifically
negotiate with its subjects.
barring individuals employed as police officers, firefighters-and, in some
jurisdictions, teachers-from striking and joining certain labor organizations;
Congress passed a law specifically prohibiting strikes and unionization by
Washington, D.C. police. 208 Federal employees were generally granted the right
to organize with the passage of the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912.209 But the
right to organize and bargain remained elusive for law enforcement personnel.
Legal and policing scholars have explored the rise and power of police
unions in American cities. 2 10 Law enforcement ranks first attempted to organize
during the late 1800s "to provide pension and insurance programs and to fulfill
2 11
While those efforts eventually proved
the social needs of their members."
not
without a heavy cost to the early
it
was
in
Boston,
for
officers
fruitful
2
collective bargaining efforts by sworn officers.21 Though many private and
213
the
public sector employees had successfully lobbied for the right to organize,
Boston strike caused many local governments to pass legislation specifically
2 14
forbidding police and firefighters from organizing.
The tumultuous relations between African Americans and police officers in
D.

SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER

250 (1948).

203.

STERLING

204.

JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,

AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 25 (2004).
205. Id. at 26-27.
206. Id. at 13-14.
207.

RICHARD C. KEARNEY & PATRICE M. MARESCHAL, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE

PUBLIC SECTOR 16-17 (CRC Press, 5th ed. 2014).
208. SLATER, supra note 204, at 23-24.
209. Id. at 19.
210. See id. at 15-38. See generally Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions:
Exploring One ofthe Most ImportantAreas ofAmerican Policing, in POLICE REFORM FROM
&

THE BOTTOM UP: OFFICERS AND THEIR UNIONS AS AGENTS OF CHANGE 88 (Monique Marks
David Sklansky eds., 2012); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE 199-200 (2d ed. 1998); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts,66 DUKE.

L.J. 1191, 1234-35 (2017).
211. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 207, at 15.
212. Walker, supra note 210, at 150.
213. SLATER, supra note 204, at 16 (discussing history of postal employee and private
sector employee unions prior to start of police unions).

214.

Id. at 35-36.
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major cities during the mid-to-late 1960s provided a new opportunity for officers
to organize and to leverage their power while seeking better wages and fair
treatment. In Watts, California, witness accounts of a traffic stop between a black
citizen and a white officer inflamed a community that had reportedly become too
familiar with officers harassing black community members. 2 15 The revolt that
followed lasted six days. 2 16 Similar revolts also took place in Detroit,2 17

Newark, 2 18 and Cleveland 2 19 following what community members and witnesses
described as a history of police harassment and brutality.
Leaders within the police rank-and-file had spent considerable time
garnering the political support of city leaders despite the fact that they were not
legally able to negotiate CBAs between their unions and their respective
municipalities.2 20 Ongoing racial tensions and demands for civil rights from
African Americans changed all of this. 221 The 1960s saw the enactment of state
statutes giving public employees, including police officers, the right to
collectively bargain employment contracts with government employers. 222 The
statutes provided unions with an opportunity to curtail the rise of demands for
civilian oversight while defining the process by which officers could be
disciplined for misconduct. 223 After being regarded with contempt following the
Boston strike that sought to secure affordable wages and better work conditions,
police unions re-emerged with increased political strength.224 Now, they were
largely accepted.2 25 This newfound acceptance coincided with community
demands for human and civil rights. 226 The number of union members has grown
dramatically since the 1960s, when there were fewer than 90,000 members. 227

215. Watts Riots, CIVIL RIGHTS DIG. LIBRARY, https://perma.cc/ZZ6F-2XXV (archived
Jan. 16, 2019); Watts Riot Begins, HISTORY.CoM, https://perma.cc/VF8E-TJU7 (archived Jan.

16, 2019).
216.
217.

Watts Riots, supra note 215.
Detroit Riots Begin, HISTORY.COM, https://perma.cc/6RJM-9KWJ (archived Jan.

17, 2019).
218.

See Nancy Solomon, 40 Years On, Newark Re-Examines Painful Riot Past, NPR

(July 14, 2007), https://perma.cc/SDS6-CD8Y.
219. See Hough, CLEVELAND HISTORICAL, https://perma.cc/2HS3-8A59 (archived Jan.
16, 2019); Glenville Shootout, OHIO HISTORY CENT., https://perma.cc/GC5M-34AJ (archived
Jan. 16, 2019).
220. Walker, supra note 210, at 199-200; Catherine Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police

Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 736 (2017).
221. Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability?An
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers' Bills of Rights, 14 Bos. U. PUB. INTEREST

L.J. 185, 196 (2005).
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Fisk & Richardson, supranote 220, at 736, 740-41.
Id. at 736-37
Id.
Id.
Id.; Walker, supranote 210, at 199; Rushin, supra note 210, at 1234-35.

227.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 1701,
OCCUPATIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING NEEDS: INFORMATION FOR PLANNING TRAINING
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Unions now represent over 500,000 officers in 2018.228
B.

How Collective Bargaining Is Used to Undermine Police Reform

Union membership has afforded officers, as public sector employees,
important employment protections. While there is no federal statute conferring
collective bargaining rights to government employees at the municipal and state
levels,229 approximately thirty-three states provide some form of collective
230
General principles from the
bargaining rights to law enforcement personnel.
employees' state statutory
public
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) inform
23
rights. 1 Those principles include the rights to organize, to form and participate
in labor organizations, to choose their own representatives through whom to
232
What
bargain collectively, and to choose not to engage m organizing efforts.
the right to bargain collectively means for any one group varies by state. It is
most commonly understood that the right provides unions the power to negotiate
233
regarding "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
Securing and protecting this right is understandably of great importance to
officers considering the arduous and oppressive work conditions endured by
234
Contemporary societal
those in law enforcement during the early 1900s.
norms and laws recognize the need for employees to work a reasonable number
of hours per week while earning fair compensation for that work. As a result, in
most jurisdictions public- and private-sector union employees have the right to
235
negotiate terms and conditions of employment.
Union leaders believe they are charged with protecting the interests of their
members. 23 6 They often do so with a singular focus on how to create work
conditions reflective of the role police officers play in society and supportive of
the often stressful and dangerous conditions under which they work. The rise of
unions against the backdrop of community demands for non-discriminatory and
humane policing during the civil rights era unfortunately resulted in the

PROGRAMS IN THE 1970's, at 18 (1971).
228.
See About the Fraternal Order of Police, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
https://perma.cc/9ABE-P9Y5 (archived Jan. 17, 2019) (estimating "more than 330,000
members"); NATI'L Ass'N OF POLICE ORGS., https://perma.cc/5M5J-JSHW (archived Jan. 16,
2019) (estimating "more than 241,000 sworn law enforcement officers" in their organization).
The federal statute that confers collective bargaining rights, 29 U.S.C. § 157
229.
(2017), excludes "any State or political subdivision thereof' from its definition of"employer."

29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
230. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 207, at 65-66.
231. Id. at 75.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 77. This scope is derived from the NLRA which, as discussed above, serves
as a model for the most customary state law bargaining rights. Id. at 75, 77.
234. See SLATER, supra note 204, at 14-15.
235. KEARNEY & MARESCHAL, supra note 207, at 30-33.
236. See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 220, at 715.
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continuation of diametrically opposed interests between the government
employers and their employee groups.237 This is demonstrated by continued
efforts by law enforcement organizations to prevent community involvement in
accountability practices, such as civilian oversight.
Many collective bargaining agreements contain provisions describing the
processes by which alleged officer misconduct may be disciplined if those
allegations proved to be well-founded.23 8 These agreements typically contain
terms that require the department to charge an officer with alleged wrongdoing
during a specified period of time or risk the ability to exact discipline for the
infraction, while also containing provisions that hinder effective
investigations. 239
It is undeniable that all individuals and systems benefit from fair and
reasonable due process. Law enforcement personnel are no different and should
be afforded the timely, fair, and impartial process that employees with bargaining
rights generally expect. There is an inherent tension between the creation of a
disciplinary structure that provides due process to officers without compromising
the government employer's right to identify and reduce the number of individuals
not suited to serve the public in a law enforcement capacity. Including terms in
union contracts that limit the employer's ability to monitor and manage the
misconduct of officers goes far beyond merely ensuring that disciplinary
processes are fair, timely, and impartial. Indeed, such provisions make it
increasingly difficult for police departments to track misconduct and reduce the
number of officers unable or unwilling to meet the demands of their employment.

237. See Paul S. Bryant, Hybrid Employees: Defining and Protecting Employees
Excludedfrom the Coverage of the NationalLabor RelationsAct, 41 VAND. L. REv. 601, 603

(1988) (discussing how the diametric opposition of employer and employee interests was one
of the underlying assumptions that led to the passage of the Wagner Act, the precursor of the
NLRA, in 1935); Anne Marie Lofaso, Workers'Rights as NaturalHuman Rights, 71 U.MIAMI
L. REv. 565, 636-37 (2017) (discussing the inherent conflict between the interests of
employers and employees); WALKER, supra note 210, at 199 (discussing the re-birth of police
unions in opposition to community demands for civilian oversight).
238.
See Police Contracts Database, POLICE UNION CONTRACT PROJECT,
http://perma.cc/5LQT-LFZJ (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
239. Rushin, supranote 210, at 1198; Agreement Between the Fraternal Order of Police

Chicago Lodge No. 7 and the City of Chicago, Effective Jul. 1, 2012 through June 30, 2017 at
¶ 6.1.D; Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland
Police Patrolmen's Association (C.P.P.A) Non-Civilian Personnel, Effective Apr. 1, 2013Mar. 31, 2016 at ¶ 12(1); Master Agreement Between the City of Detroit and the Detroit Police
Officers Association, 2014-2019 at § 9 ¶¶ C, E; Memorandum of Understanding Between the
Baltimore City Police Department and the Baltimore City Lodge No.3, Fraternal Order of
Police, Inc. Unit I: Police Officers, Police Agents, and Flight Officers, Fiscal Years 2014-2016

at Art. 16 ¶ A(3)(c); MD Code, Public Safety, § 3-104(c)(l)-(2); Memorandum of
Understanding No. 24 for Joint Submission to The City Council Regarding Police Officers,
Lieutenant and Below Representation Unit by and between the City of Los Angeles and the
Los Angeles Police Protective League at Art. 8.2.B.1 (Jul. 1, 2011) (cross-references Los

Angeles Charter and Administrative Code § 1070 (c), which has time limits for disciplinary
action).
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As a result, law enforcement agencies continue to employ officers involved in
2 40
This issue is connected
repeated incidents of alleged or confirmed misconduct.
to another common provision that can be found in collective bargaining
agreements: the requirement that allegations of misconduct and related
disciplinary actions be removed from the personnel files of officers in as little as
six months and up to six years.2 4 1 The removal of documented instances of
officer misconduct prevents such information from being considered in
242
It wipes the subject officer's record clean
subsequent disciplinary proceedings.
Union contracts that limit the
eligibility.
for the purposes of promotion
government employer's ability to manage its employees serve only to exacerbate
difficulties with modem reform efforts.
The contract between the City of Cleveland and the Cleveland Patrolmen's
Association in effect at the time of the Department of Justice's investigation and
subsequent settlement with the City of Cleveland contained a provision that
required civilian complainants to file complaints alleging police misconduct in
243
The settlement
their own handwriting and to do so under their own signature.
agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Cleveland in
2015 provided that the City would work with the unions to revise this portion of
their union contract. The settlement agreement called for civilian complaints to
be taken in a variety of ways-electronically, telephonically, and in person-and
also allowed for third party and anonymous complaints to be received against
officers.24 4
The Cleveland consent decree also required the city to negotiate with the
unions on the issue of police disciplinary record retention. The decree called for
24 5
the city to maintain police disciplinary records in officer files for ten years.
The union contract in place at the time of the settlement agreement broke
discipline down into two categories and allowed for a much shorter retention
time: verbal warnings and written reprimands could only be kept in the file for
six months, and documentation of other disciplinary actions meted against
officers for misconduct could only be kept in the file for two years after the

240. See CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, https://cpdp.co/ (last visited June 8, 2019)
(live database of complaints and outcomes for officers employed by the Chicago Police
Department); P.R. Lockhart, Officer Who Shot Antwon Rose Is Accused ofPast Civil Rights
Violations, Vox (July 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/BPX3-KW28; Kenneth Moton & Morgan
Winsor, 'No Justification'forOfficer Charged with Homicide in Killing of Unarmed Teen,
ProsecutorSays, ABC NEWS (June 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/4XZF-7R5V.
241. Rushin, supra note 210, at 1228-30.
242. Id. at 1195-96.
243. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland
Police Patrolmen's Association (C.P.P.A.) Non-Civilian Personnel, supra note 239, at
¶ 12(m); Settlement Agreement at¶ 202, United States v. City of Cleveland (N.D. Ohio 2015)
(agreeing "to allow civilian complaints to be submitted ... verbally or in writing" or in other
ways "and with or without a signature from complainant").
244. Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. City of Cleveland, supra note 242.
245. Id at ¶ 249.
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imposition of discipline.24 6 The contract negotiated in early 2018 falls far short
of the ten-year retention requirement of the consent decree. Instead, the union
contract prohibits discipline records from being used for "progressive discipline
purposes" for a specified time period depending upon the category of discipline;
one year for verbal warnings and written reprimands and three years for
disciplinary suspensions.24 7
Interestingly enough, the new contract no longer addresses the length of time
records can be retained in an officer's personnel file but does impose a three-year
time limit on past issues being considered in new disciplinary matters. 248
However, merely tracking and increasing the length of time records are kept fails
to effectively increase police accountability. In order for police departments to
have effective accountability mechanisms, the records need to not only be
retained, but also be of use to supervisors and investigators when subsequent
instances of misconduct occur. Limiting the timeframe by which the Division
can use prior misconduct when deciding what discipline should be imposed for
repeated, future misconduct circumvents the accountability reforms required
under the consent decree.
The consent decree in Cleveland drew fiery dissent from the head of the
Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association. Detective Steve Loomis, the union
President at the time, made unsubstantiated proclamations that the reforms would
lead to the death of police officers and threatened to fight certain terms of the
decree that contradicted the union contract. 249
The response by a local union to the settlement agreement between the
Department of Justice and the City of Portland further illustrates the issue. The
December 2012 agreement centered around the Portland Police Bureau's

246. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland
Police Patrolmen's Association (C.P.P.A.) Non-Civilian Personnel, supra note 239, at T 10.
247. Id.
248. Id.; Nick Castele, Cleveland Police Union Contract Approved by City Council,
IDEASTREAM (May 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/MEX9-T4BL.
249. Evan MacDonald, Cleveland Police Union Says Justice Department Reforms
Would EndangerPolice, CLEVELAND.COM (May 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/V9VV-JPRY. In
addition to the new use of force requirements, Mr. Loomis voiced great dissatisfaction with a
new requirement that everyday civilians be allowed to file anonymous complaints. Id. The
contract between that city and the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association union in effect at
the time of the Department of Justice's investigation and settlement agreement with the city
contained a provision requiring signatures civilian complainants alleging police misconduct.
Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association Contract, supra note 239, at ¶ 12(m). The
complaints had to be in their own handwriting and their own signature. Id. The only exception
identified was for illiterate complainants. Id. In that instance, the union contract required that
the complainant's statement be audio recorded. Id The settlement agreement between the U.S.
Department of Justice and the City of Cleveland in 2015 provided that the City would work
with the unions to revise this portion of their union contract; it called for civilian complaints
to be taken in a variety of ways-electronically, telephonically, and in person-and also
allowed for third party and anonymous complaints to be received against officers. See
Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. City of Cleveland, supra note 243.
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250
Nearly two
treatment of persons suffering from apparent mental health crises.
years passed before the department began to implement of use-of-force reforms
because the federal judge overseeing the reform process partially granted the
union's motion to intervene. 25 1 Kelly Swoboda and Nicholas Davis, two
individuals in the midst of separate mental health crises, were killed by Portland
police in the interim. 2 52 The purported purpose of the intervention was to afford
the union an opportunity to protect its interests and ensure that no conflicts
between the consent decree and the collective bargaining agreement existed at
253
the time the decree was approved by the court.
At the time of consent decree negotiations, the Portland Police Association
raised concerns regarding certain provisions of the decree. Concerns about when
officers would be interviewed following uses of force and the process by which
investigations of alleged officer misconduct would be handled were included in
2 54
The
the union's litany of objections to the terms of the settlement agreement.
consent decree required officers involved in uses of lethal force and in-custody
deaths to be interviewed and to participate in an on-scene walk-through with
investigators. 255 The decree also required a more streamlined investigation
256
That process empowered
process for alleged non-criminal officer misconduct.
the Independent Police Review Division to conduct independent reviews and
investigations where warranted. 257 The intention was to replace a dual-track
process that allowed the Bureau-controlled Professional Standards Division to
conduct administrative investigations in addition to those conducted by the
Independent Police Review Division.2 58

250.

Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) at 3, United States v.

City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265, (D. Or. Dec. 17, 2012).
See Aimee Green, 'Groundbreaking' Settlement on Portland Police Use of
251.
Excessive Force Draws Praise, Disappointment, OREGONIAN (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://perma.cc/YH67-TCFY (reporting that the judge signed off on decree requiring annual
progress reports on police reform for up to five years, ending two years of "turmoil and
uncertainty" after the Department of Justice investigation occurred); United States v. City of

Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265-SI, 2013 WL 12309780, at *3, 10 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013).
252.

Green, supra note 251.

253.

United States v. City of Portland, 2013 WL 12309780, at *3-5. The City of Portland

and the United States' concession that some of the terms of the consent decree conflicted with
unspecified terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement supported the court's finding
that the Union had a protectable interest. Unfortunately, the finding failed to identify the nature
of the terms at issue. A more focused analysis of the provisions at issue could have led the
court to recognize that that the relevant provisions were within the sole purview of city
management and, therefore, not appropriate for bargaining.
254. Memorandum in Support of Intervener-Defendant Portland Police Association's
FRCP 24 Motion to Intervene 19, United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265, 2012

WL 9385214 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013).
255.

Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), at 45 (¶ 127), No. 3:12-

cv-02265, 2012 WL 9385214 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013).
256. Id. at 45 (T 128).
257.
258.

Id.
Id.
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The union argued that these provisions were in conflict with their collective
bargaining rights and, despite entering into an agreement to move forward with
the consent decree, reserved the right to grieve the implementation. 259 The
resulting contract between the union and the City of Portland failed to address
whether officers are now required to participate in on-site walk-throughs during
investigations following a use of force. 260 Additionally, the terms of the
agreement with the union call into question the autonomy and effectiveness of
the Independent Police Review (IPR) process.26 1
In Baltimore, reform efforts sought-among other things-to broaden
civilian engagement with the disciplinary process. 262 The consent decree in
Baltimore calls for two civilian members to serve and vote in each disciplinary
hearing conducted by the Baltimore Police Department. 263 This conflicts with the
current union contract that specifically states that, with the exception of an
Administrative Law Judge who can serve as a hearing officer, no civilians may
serve on the disciplinary boards charged with adjudicating non-criminal
misconduct allegations against officers.264 Recent negotiations between officers
and Baltimore resulted in a short-term contract that included a pay increase for
officers but did not address the issue of adding community members to
disciplinary hearings. 265 Despite the fact that the media reported that the local
mayor considers the requirement that civilians be included on disciplinary
hearing boards to be "non-negotiable," the issue was not addressed in the most
recent contract.26 6
The existence of public sector collective bargaining rights does not diminish
state obligations to manage and direct safety forces. Indeed, the state maintains
an affirmative duty to properly train, supervise, and manage its police forces.
And while the police union leadership supports and advocates for the interests of

259. Fact Sheet for the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the City, PPA, and
USDepartment of Justice, CITY OF PORTLAND OREGON, https://perma.cc/G9P4-UJBJ (archived

Jan. 16, 2019).
260. Labor Agreement between the Portland Police Association and the City of Portland
July 1, 2013-June 30, 2017 at ¶¶ 61.2.1, 61.2.2, https://perma.cc/4R42-ARHR (archived Jan.

16, 2019).
261. The referenced contract provides the entity known as the Independent Police
Review with no "authority or responsibility relating to the imposition of discipline" and
officers have specifically retained the right to challenge subpoenas issued by the IPR. Id. at TT

62.1, 62.6.
262.

Consent Decree at

T

2, 380, United States v. Police Department of the City of

Baltimore, No. 1:17-cv-00099 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/J8ZJ-AUGH.
263. Id. at T 380.
264. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Baltimore Police Department and
the Baltimore Fraternal Order of Police, Fiscal Year 2010, at 19, https://perma.cc/24G2ZXA4.
265. Id.; Ian Duncan & Kevin Rector, Baltimore Police Union, City Agree to ShortTerm Contract with 3 Percent Raise, $500 Bonus, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://perma.cc/7TD8-74X9.
266. Id.
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its members, the local government is obligated to protect the rights and interests
of their constituents. It is a managerial function of government to set the policies
and procedures of their police departments. As mentioned above, the
bargainability of a certain subject matter is determined by whether that subject
or issue is considered to involve the compensation or contemplated work
conditions of union employees.
The CBAs between local governments and their police forces contain terms
directly related to the manner in which officers can or cannot be held accountable
for their conduct. In many instances they restrict the manner in which civilian
2 67
Additional obstacles to accountability
complaints can be filed against officers.
can be found in CBAs that limit the amount of time that information pertaining
to officer discipline can be included in that officer's personnel file for the
268
Some agreements also permit member
purposes of promotion considerations.
pertaining to internal investigations
evidence
review
to
officers the unique ability
269
prior to being interviewed.
The manner in which complaints are filed or the length of time discipline
can be used to consider an officer's suitability for promotion should not be
assumed to infringe on due process. Reforms in this area are not designed in any
way to impede or alter the administrative hearings designed to determine whether
discipline is appropriate for alleged misconduct. Indeed, an officer's right to be
fairly considered for a promotion should not take precedent over the managerial
duty and obligation of a city to ensure that the lives of its citizens are not unduly
harmed by officers who, whether willfully or negligently, fail to employ training
and tactics that comport with constitutional policing.
It is, however, the oft-perceived vagueness of the clause "other terms and
conditions of employment" that is repeatedly the subject of court filings in both
the bargaining and structural reform litigation context. Justice Stewart's widelycited concurrence in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B.
acknowledged that "conditions of employment" can be interpreted in many
270
That opinion, though it involves the
different ways in the bargaining context.
private sector, briefly traces the legislative history of the National Labor
Relations Act and asserts that Congress aimed to limit the scope and class of
27
topics about which employers and employees are compelled to bargain. 1 As
Stewart wrote, "It is important to note that the words of the statute are words of
limitation . . . [it] does not say that the employer and employees are bound to
272
His concurrence also
confer upon any subject which interests either of them."

267.
268.
269.

See Rushin, supra note 210, at 1220.

271.
272.

Id.at220-21.
Id. at 220 (emphasis added).

Id.
Id.
270. Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 221 (1964) (Stewart, J
concurring).
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pointed to the prevailing opinions of at least seven U.S. judicial circuits that
found management decisions made by employers not to be a condition of
employment subject to the bargaining process. 273 Instead, the opinion argues that

in addition to the practical "physical dimensions" of the job such as the hours
and type of work, the meaning of the phrase "other terms and conditions of
employment" must also include the right to bargain over whether or not the job
will continue to exist. 274 Undercutting the right to bargain over wages and hours
by replacing one set of workers for less expensive subcontractors or
circumventing seniority and discrimination rights is not permissible under
collective bargaining. 275
Issues pertaining to "entrepreneurial control" in the private-sector-as seen
in Fibreboard-areanalogous to "management rights" in the public sector.
Public policy concerns have rightfully influenced the determination of
management rights. This is because governmental decisions that affect the public
in a significant way should be made by democratically elected officials. As
discussed more fully in Subpart III.2.b, rules related to police use-of-deadlyforce are a classic example of the need for management to be the decision-maker
for police policies and issues that will significantly impact the public.
Several state courts have evaluated the "other terms and conditions of
employment" issue in the public sector. State court decisions generally speak
squarely to the issue of what is and is not a bargainable right for law enforcement
in their respective jurisdictions. The managerial prerogative exception issues
subject to bargaining are widely accepted by state courts. 27 6 This exception
removes policy matters-those issues that are of importance and concern to the
general public-from the scope of bargainable issues. Some states have passed
laws detailing the types of issues that fall under the categories of bargainable
issues and managerial prerogative.
A city charter provision in Denver led the Colorado Supreme Court to rule
directly on the issue of a new disciplinary matrix for Denver firefighters.2 77 The
bargaining unit representing firefighters attempted to bargain the provisions of
the new matrix with city officials. 278 Both the trial court and the court of appeals
found in favor of the union and enjoined the government-employer from
unilaterally revising the matrix. In doing so, the disciplinary matrix was deemed
to be a "term and condition of employment" and, consequently, subject to
collective bargaining. 279
273. Id. at 221-22.
274. Id. at 222.
275. Id. at 222-25.
276. Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State Public
Employment Labor Relations, 84 A.L.R.3d 242, at II § 3[a] (2018).

277.
2014).
278.
279.

City of Denver v. Denver Firefighters Local No. 858, 320 P.3d 354, 355 (Colo.
Id. at 356.
Id
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The Colorado Supreme Court conducted a de novo review of the contract
issue on appeal.280 It reviewed the city charter and made two findings: 1) the
charter grants the city power to draft and implement discipline policies; and 2)
the charter provisions regarding the firefighters' collective bargaining rights does
28
not list discipline as a negotiable term. 1 Looking at the collective bargaining
contract as an "auxiliary source" in its analysis, the court found that statutory
interpretation required giving plain meaning to the terms and strictly construing
the language. 282 The court disavowed contrary arguments that would lead them
283
The court went on to hold that: 1) the city
to "absurd or unreasonable results."
disciplinary rules; and 2) the
implement
and
draft
both
could unilaterally
collective bargaining rights of firefighters do not limit governmental "rights or
284
functions of management."
The court in Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. New York State Public
Employment Relations Board relied on both local law and public policy to find
285
This
that discipline policies are precluded from bargaining by police unions.
of
conditions
and
all
terms
requires
that
presumption
strong
is true despite the
service
civil
York's
New
employment to be subject to bargaining under
legislation, the Taylor Law. 286 The court found that where the New York City
charter gave the Police Commissioner sole authority over police discipline and
public policy renders the subject non-negotiable, the matter must be precluded
from contract negotiations.28 The quasi-military nature of the police force was
noted by the court as one justification for government officials to have command
over discipline matters. 288 The court also cited public policy reasons for limiting
collective bargaining rights, namely the sensitive nature of police work requiring
balancing the need for discipline and officer morale, as well as adhering to the
289
management authority delegated by local municipal laws.
Managerial policy exception also precluded unions from using the
bargaining process to add a just cause standard to discipline determinations in
New Hampshire. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed a Public
Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) determination that sought to force
the city to bargain over the issue. 290 The PELRB had found that the managerial
29
policy exception did not preclude city officials from negotiations. 1 The court

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 357.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 360.

285.

848 N.E.2d 448, 449, 451-53 (N.Y. 2006).

286.
287.

Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 452-54

288.

Id. at 453-54.

289.

Id.

290.

In re City of Concord, 651 A.2d 944, 945 (N.H. 1994).

291.

Id. at 946.
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disagreed and relied on the limited scope of public-employee bargaining rights
in doing so. 292 The scope is limited in order to avoid allowing the bargaining
process to establish "power public employee unions in a way that would leave
competing groups in the political process at a permanent and substantial
disadvantage."2 93 Managerial exception is identified as a mechanism by which
to achieve this goal. 294A subject matter can be both a term of employment and a
managerial responsibility. Whether or not the subject matter interferes with
public control is the defining factor. 295 The court found that the PELRB failed to
appropriately apply the managerial policy exception and that the city was not
obligated to negotiate on the inclusion of a just cause standard to the discipline
policy.

296

This analysis provides some guidance and a framework for evaluating the
rights and interests of police unions in the structural reform litigation context.
The assertion that a union has a generic Rule 24 interest in the matter should not
be sufficient, as the stakes in police misconduct cases are too high. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 24 provides a mechanism by which a non-party to a lawsuit
can seek to intervene and become a party to the action. 297 As discussed more
fully in the following section, decisions by courts on these motions often hinge
on the purported interest of the movant in the litigation. Instead, decisions on
police union motions to intervene in structural reform litigation should be
informed by whether the asserted interests fall under either the managerial
prerogative or bargainable category. Doing so will permit local governments to
maintain their authority and responsibility over police powers and ensure that
they implement the long-awaited remedial measures aimed at establishing
required constitutional policing. As discussed below, an extremely liberal
analysis of Rule 24 motions to intervene by courts often ignores the nature of the
litigation. Such an approach can contribute to unjust delays and unmerited
interference in the reform process. The section concludes with an examination of
arbitration grievances and how they have at times been used by unions to obstruct
reform efforts.

292.
293.

294.

Id. at 947.
Id at 946 (citations omitted).
Id. at 946.

295. Id. at 948. The managerial exception in New Hampshire is analyzed under a threepart inquiry: 1) has the subject matter been reserved to "exclusive managerial authority" by
constitution or statute?; 2) does the subject primarily affect terms and conditions of
employment and not a broad managerial policy?; and 3) does the subject proposal "interfere
with public control of government functions"? Id.
296. Id.
297. Section (a) of the rule governs movants who claim they have a right to intervene
and it is technically referred to as an "intervention of right." Section (b) of the same rule
governs instances where the court evaluates motions seeking permissive intervention. FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)-(b). The scope of this Article focuses on the right of intervention under Section

(a).
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1. Motions to Intervene - A Deeper Analysis Is Needed in Structural
Reform Litigation

Police unions in jurisdictions with collective bargaining rights or civil
service protections have moved to intervene in federal cases involving structural
reforms of those departments. Those motions typically argue that the moving
298
union has a right under Federal Rule 24(a) to intervene in the action. Motions
to intervene as of right have been interpreted by federal courts using a similar
four-part test; with some circuits employing a more liberal interpretation towards
intervention than others. 299 That test generally places the burden on the unionmovant to demonstrate: 1) the timeliness of their application; 2) that the interest
the union seeks to protect is significant and is related to the subject of the lawsuit;
3) the resolution of the case may "impair or impede" the ability of the union to
protect their interest; and 4) the interest of the union may not be adequately
300
The failure to
represented by the federal government or the local jurisdiction.
to
a motion to
fatal
meet one prong of the requirements under Federal 24(a) is
301
This Subpart uses prior court rulings on motions to intervene in
intervene.
police reform cases to evaluate each of the four prongs and demonstrate how the
analysis often falls short of giving reform efforts the particular focus necessary.
a. Timeliness
Courts have expressed an interest in ensuring that reform litigation not be
3 02
At least
delayed or derailed by an untimely assertion of a right to intervene.

Unions and other interveners also move, in the alternative, for permissive
298.
intervention under section (b). Federal Rule 24(b), in relevant part, provides: "(1) In General.
On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional
right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main
action a common question of law or fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

299. 1OOReporters LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 307 F.R.D. 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
Ungar v. Arafat, 634 F.3d 46, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2011); Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298,
1302-03 (11th Cir. 2008); "R" Best Produce, Inc. v. Shulman-Rabin Mktg. Corp., 467 F.3d
238, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2006); Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998);
Richman v. First Woman's Bank (In re Richman), 104 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 1997); Coal. of
Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir.
1996); Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n. v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 365-

66 (3d Cir. 1995); Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co. v. Tracy, 6 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 1993); Sierra
Club v. Robertson, 960 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. City of Chicago, 798 F.2d
969, 972 (7th Cir. 1986); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d
452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984).
300. Ernest E. Shaver, Note, Intervention in the Public Interest Under Rule 24(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1549, 1551-52 (1988)
(outlining four-part test to determine applicant's right to intervene).
301. Nevertheless, the court in Floydcontinued with its analysis and rejected the unions'
arguments that their significant interests of reputation and collective bargaining rights were at

stake. Floyd v. City of New York, 302 F.R.D. 69, 76, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
302. See United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388, at
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one court has expressed reluctance to disturb the finality of a police-related
consent decree absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances; as that court's
language suggests, providing litigants with an assured expectation regarding the
finality of the matter is of importance to the judiciary. 303
Permitting third-parties to intervene in cases at the eleventh hour is not
conducive to the swift administration of justice. These considerations are to be
generally balanced against the court's ability to use its discretion and be flexible
in its determination of the timeliness requirement.304
The analysis should not stop there. 305 Efforts to root out pervasive police
misconduct have not been successful. This is true despite monetary judgments
against individual officers and municipalities under § 1983. Individual efforts to
secure large-scale reform have failed in America's highest court.306 The
enactment of § 12601 and the cases that have followed should not be made to
suffer obstructionist delays through motions to intervene.
We see a stark example of this type of attempt in Floyd, where five unions
moved to intervene and modify remedies previously ordered by the district court.
307 The unions sought to intervene in the action nearly six years after the filing
of the initial complaint and several weeks after the trial court found that the city's
policies and procedures violated the rights of individuals to be free of searches
and seizures unsupported by probable cause and executed without a warrant. 308
The unions argued that their motion was timely because the need to intervene did
not arise until Mayor de Blasio was elected and city lawyers withdrew their
appeal of the court's order. 309 It was at that time, based on the trial court's
*11 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012).
303. See United States v. City of New Orleans, 947 F.Supp.2d 601, 615 (2013) (The
city moved to vacate the consent decree under Rule 60(b).).
304. See NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973) (explaining that the timeliness
determination is within the sound discretion of the court and "is to be determined from all the
circumstances").
305. In evaluating the timeliness factor, no reasonable argument could be made that a
motion to intervene is untimely during the phase when the litigation has yet to officially begin.
It is important to understand, however, that in most suits initiated by the Department of Justice,
a large bulk of the work towards developing the scope of the reform efforts is complete prior
to the filing of the Complaint. The investigation into alleged misconduct has occurred.
Moreover, in instances where the municipality chooses to resolve the matter instead of trying
the merits of the case, the terms of the settlement agreement have been fully negotiated by the
parties.

306. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 365-66 (1976).
307. Floyd v. City ofNew York, 302 F.R.D. 69, 76-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The five unions
were the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., the Lieutenants
Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., the Sergeants Benevolent Association,
the Detectives' Endowment Association, Inc., and the NYPD Captains Endowment
Association. Id.
308. For a litigation timeline, see Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al., CTR. FOR
CONsT. RTs., https://perma.cc/5FGA-6S33 (archived January 16, 2019).
309. Floyd, 302 F.R.D. at 84; Azi Paybarah et al., De Blasio on Stop-and-Frisk: 'We
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remedial orders, that the unions realized their collective bargaining interests had
10
been implicated and remained unprotected. 3 The court pointed to the widely
publicized nature of the case, the ability of other stakeholders to assert interest
in the case through various filings, and the testimony of some sixty-four members
of the NYPD during the liability phase of the case and found the delayed union
31
motions to intervene to be untimely.
b. What Should Qualify as a Significant Interest?
Whether police unions have any significant interest in structural reform
litigation should be analyzed under the full context of the litigation. Some courts
have generally evaluated this factor on the basis of whether a simple property
interest in a job exists because of rules. 312 The appellate court in United States v.
City of Los Angeles reversed the lower court's finding that the union had no
protectable interest in the merits of the underlying action. 313 The appellate court
acknowledged that the police unions could not credibly assert a protectable
3 14
That
interest in violating the constitutional rights of individuals.
acknowledgement amounted only to a hollow proclamation when the appellate
court ultimately found that the union had an interest in the matter because of the
request for injunctive relief regarding the alleged unconstitutional conduct of its
members. 3 15 The court went on to identify any potential conflict between the
union's Memorandum of Understanding with the City of Los Angeles and the
316
agreed upon consent decree as a source of protectable interest for the union.
The broad analysis employed by the court merely evaluated 1) whether the
interest asserted by the union was legally protected, and 2) if that interest was
3 17
It also
related in some way to the claims asserted by the federal government.
pointed to the fact that, because the consent decree had not yet been entered and
the city's officers were still potentially subject to injunction, the union had
interests in: 1) the conflict between their previously negotiated memorandum of
understanding and the consent decree, and 2) the ability to present its position on
3 18
the existence of a conflict between the same.

Changed It Intensely', POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/5TQ8-HGM7 (explaining

that the use of stop-and-frisk in NYC has decreased 97% from its peak in 2011.)
310. Floyd, 302 F.R.D. at 84.
311. Id. at 76, 80, 84.
312.

United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388, at *9

(E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012) (finding that officers have a property interest in their job, but the
proposed Consent Decree does not modify Civil Service system for the officers).

313.

288 F.3d 391, 398-99 (9th Cir. 2002).

314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 398-99.
Id at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id.

318.

Id. at 399-400.
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This reasoning by the court loses sight of the forest for the trees. The threat
of members being enjoined from engaging in business as usual at the LAPD had
passed. After a well-publicized investigation into the Rampart Scandal, 319 the
City of Los Angeles and the Department of Justice agreed that extensive reforms
were necessary within the LAPD. 320 Those reforms were necessary following
large settlements to victims who suffered serious injuries as a result of
unconstitutional conduct of its officers. 32 1 The agreement between the parties had
been negotiated, signed, and filed with the federal district court overseeing the
matter. 322 The interests of the union and its members at this point amounted to a
partial stake in their desire to continue business as usual. Granting them the
opportunity to intervene under the circumstances signaled that unions should be
afforded an opportunity to negotiate how much impact reform efforts can have
on their unconstitutional misconduct. This is beyond the scope of collective
bargaining.
The court in Floyd looked at this factor of the analysis through a lens more
cognizant of the fact that the overall goal of the litigation was to reform police
conduct.3 23 It rejected the contention made by union officers that they had an
interest-reputational or contract-related-in the decree implementation. 324
There, the unions argued that they possessed the requisite interest because their
conduct had been enjoined and their reputations had been maligned by the
liability ruling made by the court. 325 Rejecting those arguments, the court

319.

See

Lou Cannon,

One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES MAG.

(Oct.

2, 2000),

https://perma.cc/SWS5-ZWZW. The Encyclopedia on Race and Crime describes the Rampart
scandal, in part:
There have been many corruption scandals in police agencies across the United States. The

Rampart Division scandal in 1999, involving officers from the Los Angeles Police Department,
is perhaps one of the worst. More than 70 officers were implicated in misconduct, including
unprovoked beatings and shootings, planting and covering up evidence, stealing and dealing
drugs, and perjury. The officers involved in the Rampart corruption scandal were driven by
power, racism, and greed.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND CRIME 700 (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L. Gabbidon eds.,

2009).
320. Consent Decree at T 1, 6, United States v. Los Angeles, No. 2:00-cv-11769 (C.D.
Cal. June 19, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/826956/download.
321. See generally Paul J. Kaplan, Looking Through the Gaps: A CriticalApproach to
the LAPD's Rampart Scandal, 36 Soc. JUST. 61, 61 (2009) (discussing costs of over $1 billion

dollars paid by the City of Los Angeles for the corrupt and illegal conduct of its officers);
Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department'sBoard
of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 545, 549 (2001) ("Many
individuals were subjected to excessive police force and suffered very serious injuries as a
result.")
322. Consent Decree at 94, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:00-cv-11769

(C.D. Cal. 2001).
323. Floyd, 302 F.R.D. at 98. See also Floyd v. City of New York, Civ. RTs. LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://perma.cc/GU2Z-GPPC (archived Jan. 18, 2019) (noting that police
unions' motions to intervene were denied).
324. Floyd, 302 F.R.D. at 82.
325.

Id

186

STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [XV:137

reasoned that the city's conduct and policies, not that of union employees, were
subject to injunction.3 26 The court also found that the city bore responsibility for
the unconstitutional conduct of its anonymous employees for whom no personal
327
interest or private conduct was at issue.
c. More Analysis Is Needed When Determining if a Significant
Protectable Interest Will Be "Impaired or Impeded"
Determinations by a court that a movant-union has a significant interest are
not enough for a successful motion to intervene in structural reform litigation.
The movant is required to show that the interest will be negatively impacted or
32 8
Identifying the precise nature of
impaired through the resolution of the case.
the interest is essential in structural reform litigation. Cases aimed at rooting out
longstanding, systemic police abuses are unlike the typical cases originally
contemplated for intervention under Rule 24.
A court that classifies general collective bargaining rights as a protectable,
significant interest in police reform litigation will be easily led astray from the
true purpose of the agreement to reform police departments. This is true even
when consent decree language disavows any intent to impede or impair union
collective bargaining rights. We see this in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United
States v. City ofLos Angeles. 329 That court found no reassurance in the settlement
agreement language that disavowed any preemptive power of the decree over
officer bargaining rights. 330 And, citing a private sector employment
discrimination case, 331 the court emphasized the union's lack of consent to the
policy changes and the city's ability to secure declaratory relief in federal court
instead of state court as indicia that the ability of the union to protect its interests

326.
327.

Id. at 124.
Id.

328. United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388, at *2
(E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012).
329. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 400-01 (9th Cir. 2002).
3 3 0. Id.
331. Id. The court cites EqualEmployment OpportunityComm'n v. American Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974) to support its finding that the union had an
interest ensuring that its contract rights were not impaired or impeded. While the case cited
involves both a consent decree and the remedying of unconstitutional discrimination on the
part of an employer, the similarities cease at that point. The analysis by the court in City of
Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 failed to acknowledge that the underlying case at hand involved
the rights of third-party individuals, a governmental employer and a federal investigation that
concluded the life and liberty of those third-party individuals had been violated by the union
employees. Moreover, the EEOC case referenced by the court was centered on the wages and
hours of the individuals potentially affected by the terms of that consent decree. Unlike private
sector discrimination cases where seniority and/or discrimination against employees is at
issue, the constitutional matters at stake in policing may have only a nominally tangential
impact on the wages and hours of law enforcement personnel. In short, the issues central to
structural reform litigation in policing are life and liberty, not hours and wages.
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might possibly be impaired or impeded by the consent decree. Contrast that with
the decision in United States v. City ofNew Orleans.33 2 That court looked at the
language of the consent decree stating that the parties would "work with" the
Civil Service to implement the required reforms and found that the consent
decree would not impair or impact the property interest of the officers. 333 The
analysis of the court turned on the fact that while officers in New Orleans have
civil service protections, they do not have collective bargaining rights or any
similar contract with the City that was placed at risk by terms of the consent
decree. 334

The assertion that collective bargaining rights deserve blanket protections
from being impaired or impeded in the police reform context is premature. The
scope of what is bargainable should factor into the analysis. The federal court
reviewing the terms of the decree is in a prime position to understand the scope
of both the terms of the decree and the "wage, hours, and other terms of
employment" limitation on bargaining rights. The managerial function of public
and private employers is not a concept with which federal courts have no
insight.3 35 The terms of consent decrees related to policy and training on matters
such as use of force and police accountability are outside the bargainable rights
of unions. Conflating potential protectable interests that may be impeded without
any distinction as to the viability of the asserted interest and impairment evades
the issue and can impose unnecessary delays on reform efforts.
d. Union Interests Are Generally Not Aligned with the City-But Why
Does the Union Not Share the Federal Government's Interest in
Delivering Constitutional Policing?
As a general tenet of labor law, the interests of employers are diametrically
opposed to those of their employees. 336 Courts presiding over police structural
reform litigation have looked to whether an employer-employee contractual
relationship exists when determining if the interests of the movant-union are
adequately represented. In the absence of a contract, the government is presumed
to represent the interests of its constituents. 337 But which governmental entity,
332.

United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388 (E.D. La.

2012).
333.

Id. at *9.

334.

Id. at *10.

335. Though litigation surrounding the bargainability of issues under the "wage, hours,
and other terms of employment" standard often occurs in state court, cases that implicate
federal law are often heard in federal court. See Verizon New York, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 360 F.3d

206, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2004); First Nat. Maintenance Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 673-75
(1981); Ford Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979); Fibreboard Paper Products

Corp v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 218 (1964).
336.
337.

See Bryant, supra note 237.
United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388, at *10

(E.D. La. 2012).
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federal or state, the union interests have been evaluated against has varied. The
New Orleans court found that the interests of the union are presumed to be
aligned with that of the federal government to ensure constitutional policing was
present within the department. 338 The union failed to identify ways in which their
interests were not aligned with the implementation of the decree and, therefore,
339
failed to rebut that presumption.
The court in U.S. v. City of Los Angeles took a different approach. In that
decision, the court agreed with the basic premise and presumption that the
340
However, unlike the
interests of citizens are represented by the government.
New Orleans analysis, the city was identified as the employer with interests
different than that of the union. 34 1 This provided the court with a basis for
determining that the existence of a collective bargaining contractual relationship
between the city and the union rendered the interests of the union to be
3 42
The court further found that
inadequately represented by the city-defendant.
status could not provide
amicus
of
nature
and
informal
the non-appealable
343
adequate protection of union interests.
While it is understood that the employment relationship between unions and
their municipal-employer create a presumed misalignment in interests, exploring
whether there are shared interests of the unions and federal government deserves
appropriate consideration by the courts. There is a reasonable basis for the
proposition that the courts should evaluate this issue from the vantage point of
the federal government since it is the plaintiff in such consent decree actions.
Using that framework, it is illogical for a union to assert that the federal
governmental interest in the delivery of constitutional policing differs from that
of the union. The stated efforts of the federal government to ensure that members
of police departments have clear policies, adequate training, and sufficient
resources to do their job would seem to be aligned with the needs and interests
of officers. As the moving party, the union should bear the burden of
demonstrating support for any position to the contrary.
As discussed in Subpart. III.B. 1(b) above, it should not be assumed that there
is a significant union interest at stake simply because a collective bargaining
agreement exists between the city and union-protected officers. The right of a
movant-union to intervene appears to turn on whether they are employed under
collective bargaining rights. 3" Outside of the finding by the New Orleans
court,345 there appears to be no mention or exploration of the nexus of interests

Id.
Id.
340. United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 401-02 (9th Cir. 2002).
338.

339.

341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 400.

344. Id. at 399-400; U.S. v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388 at
*10 (E.D. La. 2012).
345. United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924, 2012 WL 12990388, at *10

June 2019]

TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE

189

shared between the police unions and the federal government.
2. The Non-Negotiable Nature of Policies on Use of Force and Discipline
Police unions have not relied solely on motions to intervene to address their
discontent with reform efforts aimed at use-of-force and discipline policies.
Arbitration is also an impediment to law enforcement structural reform
litigation.3 46 Unions have used (and undoubtedly have more often threatened to
use) the arbitration process to combat remedial orders from courts aimed at
correcting unconstitutional practices in their respective police departments. The
reform process in Seattle illuminates the use of arbitration to block reform
efforts.
a. Police Unions Directly Attack New Use-of-Force Policies
In October 2016, the captains and lieutenants that comprise the Seattle Police
Management Association union filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the
Public Employee Relations Committee of the State of Washington. 347
Considering that the court approved the settlement agreement in August 2012,
the City of Seattle and its police department had been working for four years
with the Department of Justice and a court-appointed monitor to implement
previously agreed upon reforms aimed at remedying unconstitutional policing in
that city. 348 The grievance complained of the City's "unilateral changes" to the
police department's use-of-force, accountability, and bias-free policies and
trainings, among other areas, without providing the officers with the opportunity
to bargain over those revisions. 349 The complaint alleged that the policy change
without union involvement violated their right to bargain over terms and
conditions of employment.350
The Seattle Police Officers' Guild, the department's rank-and-file union,
also filed a grievance with the Public Employees Relations Commission
regarding a mayoral executive order requiring officers to use body-worn cameras
in a selected precinct. 351 The July 2017 mayoral order acknowledged the
potential benefits of body-worn cameras: increased accountability, decreased
(E.D. La. 2012).
346. See Rushin, supranote 210, at 1220.
347. See Seattle Police Management, Unfair Labor Practice Complaint to the Public
Employment Relations Commission 1-2 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/JF8J-VD6M.
348. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 1-2, United
States v. Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282 (Aug. 30, 2012) (U.S.A. as plaintiff).
349. Id. TT 44-45; Seattle Police Management, supra note 347.
350. Seattle Police Management, supra note 347, at 9.
351. City of Seattle, Executive Order 2017-03 (July 17, 2017) (rolling deployment to all
precincts within the department was mentioned in the Order but no details regarding timing
were provided); Steve Miletich, Seattle Police Union Files Labor Complaint Over Mayor's
Body-Camera Order, SEATrLE TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/RZ65-N2TU.
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likelihood of injuries to officers and civilians, and increased public
confidence. 352 The mayor's order was based on the premise that the use of bodyworn cameras was required for the city to successfully implement consent decree
requirements. Though the consent decree made no specific mention of bodyworn cameras, the mayor highlighted the requirement that the city accurately
report use of force in a timely manner and connected such use to the need for
officers to use the cameras. While the City acquiesced that the use of body-worn
cameras was an issue subject to bargaining, the federal judge noted that the issues
needed to be separated.353 Union officials maintained that they were not against
the use of body-worn cameras but, instead, were entitled to use the issue as a
negotiating asset in exchange for wages or benefits. 354 Rebuffing the notion that
the City could not employ cameras without union approval, Judge James Robart
declared that "[t]he citizens of Seattle [were] not going to pay blackmail for
constitutional policing." 355
The issue ultimately was resolved after the union and the City finalized a
new collective bargaining agreement later that year; the City ultimately agreed
to compensate officers an additional two percent in exchange for wearing body
cameras. 356 They did so without any formal judicial intervention or decision from
the Public Employees Relations Committee regarding the arbitrability of the
issue. 357

b. Use-of-Force and Discipline Policymaking Excluded from
Bargaining
Matters related to law enforcement structural reform litigation should not be
heard in arbitration. Courts have cited both local governmental authority and
public policy when determining that the topics of discipline and use of force are
excluded from bargaining. 35 8 Some courts use a two-prong test that examines

352. Id.
353. Seattle Executive Order, supra note 351; Steve Miletich, FederalJudge Questions
Whether Seattle Police-Union Contract in Keeping with 'Spirit'of Reforms, SEATTLE TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/EX3X-H86W.
354.
Jason Shueh, Seattle Police Union Fights Mayor's Body Camera Order,

STATESCOOP (Aug. 1, 2017, 3:28 PM), https://perma.cc/C3R4-4EBH.
355. See Miletich, supra note 351. A video of the hearing held by U.S. District Judge
James Robart's hearing on bodywom cameras and union demands can be found at United
States of America v. City of Seattle (Part 7) at 14:00-14:56, UNITED STATES COURTS
https://perma.cc/V2KT-2ZSY (archived Jan. 16, 2019) ("The citizens of Seattle are not going
to pay blackmail for constitutional policing. That's simply the bottom line.").
356. Miletich, supra note 353.
357. See Steve Miletich, Seattle Police Union Overwhelmingly Approves Contractwith
City; Includes Raises, Accountability Reforms, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018)
https://perma.cc/8A7A-7BPS.

358.

New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n, 739 N.E.2d 719, 723 (N.Y. 2000);

Patrolmen's Benevolent Assoc'n of the City of New York v. New York State Pub. Emp't

Relations Bd., 848 N.E. 2d 448, 453 (N.Y. 2006).
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whether law or public policy prevents the issue from being decided by
arbitration. 359

As articulated in City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n, the
arbitrability analysis first considers whether the subject matter of the dispute is
precluded under law or public policy from being referred to arbitration. 360 The
second prong of the test evaluates whether the right to arbitration was
appropriately exercised and if the agreement of the parties provided consent for
the issue at hand to be subject to arbitration. 36 1 If a fact-finder determines that
law or public policy, as considered under the first prong, precludes arbitration of
a particular subject matter, the analysis ends and the parties cannot arbitrate the
issue.362 The court in Uniformed Fire Officers Ass 'n found that public policy
barred requiring the municipal employer to bargain and arbitrate over certain
matters. 363 In this case, the court found employee rights to collective bargaining
could not be invoked as a means of limiting criminal investigations of alleged
illegal conduct by fire officers due to public policy concerns.364l
Those concerTs
were evidenced through the court's recognition of: state law empowering the
government to investigate criminal conduct, the delegation of the power to the
investigative agency under the city charter, and-of equal importance-the
"significant interest" of the city and its citizens to be assured that its government
is free of corruption. 365
Issues precluded from arbitration are not limited to those regarding
criminality. Patrolmen'sBenevolent Ass'n of the City ofNew York v. New York
State PublicEmployment Relations Board, involved two arbitration-related cases
and consolidated them for the court's consideration. 366 The decision invalidated
provisions of collective bargaining agreements with officers in New York City
and the Town of Orangetown on the grounds that the respective legislative
histories for each local government demonstrated a strong public policy
justification for local officials to maintain sole authority over matters pertaining
to police discipline. 367
The New York City contract involved several provisions related to
disciplinary procedures for officers employed by the city. Those provisions
involved such things as the amount of time officers involved in departmental

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n, 739 N.E.2d. at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 722.
Id
Id. at 722-23.
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York v. New York State Pub.

Emp't Relations Bd., 848 N.E. 2d 448,453 (N.Y. 2006); Orangetown, 2 No. 34 (NY Int. Mar.
28, 2006), https://perma.cc/K34D-KG53; Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, 3 No. 32 (NY
Int. Mar. 28, 2006), https://perma.cc/K34D-KG53.
367. Patrolmen'sBenevolent Ass'n ofNew York, 848 N.E.2d at 453-54.
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investigations were permitted to meet with lawyers prior to being questioned, the
inability of the city to revise certain interrogation procedures, and the ability to
368
The court
expunge disciplinary proceedings from employee records.
admittedly recognized the importance of the collective bargaining rights
conferred to public employees under state law and acknowledged the existing
tension between that statutory right and the strong public policy related to police
discipline. 369
For the Patrolmen's Benevolent court, the coverage of the issue by a local or
state law was not dispositive; instead, the court enumerated a number of instances
when courts found that the power of local government over certain subject
matters could not be subject to collective bargaining even in the absence of laws
on the specific subject matter. 370 The existence of legislation pertaining to police
discipline served to rebut any presumption of bargaining rights.37 ' In doing so,
the court traced back to 1888 the public policy in favor of relegating power over
372
The court plainly and
the police to the sole authority of local officials.
explicitly stated that "public interest in preserving official authority over the
373
police remains powerful."
This provides support for expanding the scope of potential subjects excluded
from bargaining beyond only issues of discipline. When the court looked beyond
disciplinary issues, the power of collective bargaining agreements seemed less
persuasive. This is integral to ensure that the oversight and management of police
departments does not become subsumed by the interests of powerful collective
bargaining units.
There are other police practices and policies that should not be subject to
collective bargain because they are outside the scope of terms negotiable terms.
Use-of-force policies have been found to not primarily, directly, or substantially
37 4
Citing Justice
relate to wages, hours or other conditions of employment.
Stevens's Fibreboard concurrence, the court in San Jose Peace Officer's
Association found that creation of use-of-force policy is a managerial function
best left to lawmakers and local officials because the subject matter involves
375
The court further
deciding when the government can take a human life.

368. Id. at 449.
369. Id. at 450.
370. Id. at 451. The court discusses prior rulings related to various non-negotiable
responsibilities of boards of education and law enforcement officials. Id. In addition to the
criminal investigation authority discussed above, the court highlighted the right of police
officials to decide the benefit requirements for officers returning to service following an injury
and the statutory right of city officials to select officers for promotions. Id.
371. Id. at 452.
372. Id. at 453.
373. Id.

374. San Jose Peace Officer's Ass'n v. San Jose, 78 Cal. App. 3d 935, 941-42, 949 (Ca.
Ct. App.1978).
375. Id. at 948-49. The City of San Jose argued the development of certain police
policies are a sole function of the democratic process. That argument was that public policy
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explained that the creation of the policy also requires the delicate balance of
considering three competing and equally important interests: 1) "protecting
society from criminals"; 2) officer safety; and 3) the "preservation of all human
life if possible." 376 In short, police policies related to use of force must comport
with constitutional requirements; the bounds and parameters of which should be
non-negotiable under any circumstance and certainly not in exchange for wage
and hour provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of legislation such as § 12601, § 1983, and their concomitant
litigation in policing is to remedy and prevent the violation of constitutional
rights. Ideally, the reform efforts will identify instances of abuse and prevent the
continuation of such conduct so as to avoid injury to others. A key component of
that cultural reform involves improving officer accountability. Systems and
processes must be in place to ensure that responsibility and consequences are
fairly meted out for conduct that contravenes established policies and protocol.
To effectively remedy past police abuses, there must be thorough consideration,
understanding, and evaluation of all internal and external processes involved that
affect the delivery and accountability of police services. This is the substantive
heart of the injunctive and equitable remedies necessitated under section (b) of
34 U.S.C. § 12601.
The passage of § 12601 provides another path to extricating the deeply
entrenched roots of discrimination and racism from our nation's core. Incidents
of police misconduct and corruption remain largely undeterred by the threat of
civil liability or criminal sanctions. Attempts to utilize the criminal justice system
as a means of holding officers accountable for misconduct have proven not to be
successful, even when that misconduct has resulted in the extrajudicial taking of
a life. Instead, numerous officers have either not been charged37 7 or acquitted3 78
of criminal charges. Though municipalities have incurred the cost of millions of
dollars in civil settlements for police misconduct in § 1983 claims, those same
cities have eventually been the subject of federal investigations and consent
decrees. 379 With life and liberty-the core of what makes us free Americansnecessitates that rules on when deadly force is appropriate should not be determined at the
bargaining table but should be decided by those elected as representatives of those people
against whom such force will be used and those subjected to the consequences of the policy.

Id. at 942.
376.

Id. at 946 (quoting Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n. v. Long Beach, 61 Cal. App.

3d 364, 371 (1976)).
377. For a snapshot of some recent statistics, see Jasmine C. Lee and Haeyoun Park, 15
Black Lives Ended in Confrontations with Police. 3 Officers Convicted, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2018), https://perma.cc/88SK-34D9; Matt Femer and Nick Wing, Cops ConvictedOfMurder
Last Year For On-Duty Shootings, HUFFPOST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/3KF3-5R6L.
378. Id.
379. Settlement Agreement at TT 1, 4, 7, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-
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hanging in the balance, while fully recognizing the extremely difficult task of
transforming the culture of an entire police department, it is imperative that our
system of government provide a variety of tools to eliminate repeated instances
of police misconduct and brutality.
Democratic principles require local governments, through elected and
appointed officials, to promote and protect the interests of its constituents. Power
to create and manage law enforcement agencies rests with the state. That
authority, an implicit derivative of the Tenth Amendment, is deemed essential to
380
As with other governmental
the functioning of the state-federal system.
3 1
responsibilities, 1 the development of policies and implementation of
procedures should be an exclusive function of elected and appointed officials not
to be delegated. Those responsibilities should also not be tainted by the undue
influence of private negotiations with unions. No comparable opportunity exists
for civilians and community organizations to effectively lobby for their interests

cv-01046 (N.D. Ohio 2015); Consent Decree at ¶¶ 1, 4, 7, United States v. Police Department
of Baltimore City, No. 1:17-cv-00099 (D. Md. 2017); Consent Decree Regarding the New
Orleans Police Department at 1, United States v. City of New Orleans, 2:12-cv-01924 (E.D.
La 2012); Eric Heisig, The High Cost of Police Misconduct: Cleveland Agreed To $13.2
Million In Settlement Over Two Years, CLEVELAND.COM, https://perma.cc/HNK9-C9K3;
Natasha Bertrand, Why 'It Was Only A Matter Of Time'Before BaltimoreExploded, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2015), https://perma.cc/24YT-FV7Z; How Chicago Racked Up A $662
Million Police Misconduct Bill, CRAIN'S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Mar. 20, 2016),
https://perma.cc/S8VH-CEM4. Although Chicago eventually entered into a consent decree
with the State of Illinois and not the federal government, the Department of Justice initiated
the investigation that resulted in the consent decree in that city. See Aamer Madhani, Federal
Judge Approves Consent Decree to Reform Chicago Police Department, USA TODAY (Jan.
31, 2019), https://perma.cc/4CTV-T43E. New Orleans has dealt with payouts and criminal
charges related to officer misconduct. Historically, more than fifty officers have been
prosecuted with at least nine of those cases resulting in convictions. Two of the convicted
officers were placed on death row. Prior to the consent decree in New Orleans, the city paid
out more than $3.5 million dollars in damages related to police misconduct. Timeline: NOPD's
Long History of Scandal, FRONTLINE LAW & DISORDER (Aug. 25, 2010),
https://perma.cc/8UGM-863X. Those payments do not include settlements that were paid after
the implementation of the consent decree for misconduct that occurred before federal
intervention. After that time, the City of New Orleans paid $13.3 million for Katrina-related
police violence. Campbell Robertson, New Orleans Settles Katrina-EraPolice BrutalityCases
for $13.3 Million N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/23RE-UHS8. New Orleans
also recently paid $1.5 million for the retaliatory hit ordered by a police officer that killed Kim
Groves nearly 25 years after her murder. Emily Lane, City to Pay $1.5M to Kim Groves'
Children, 24 Years
After NOPD officer HadHerKilled, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/L23R-

C45B.
380.

See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919);

United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. 1, 7 (W.D.S.C. 1944) ("The United States lacks the police
power, this was reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment."), aff'd sub nom. Old

Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945).
381. See, e.g., Cohoes City Sch. Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n., 358 N.E.2d 878, 880
(N.Y. 1976); Bd. of Educ., Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Areman, 362 N.E.2d 943, 946
(N.Y. 1977).
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in the process. 382

Unlike traditional or typical settlement agreements, consent decrees require
specific findings to be made by the court. It is those findings and the resulting
order of the court that elevate the legal meaning and effect of consent decrees. In
Buckhannon v. West Virginia DepartmentofHealth and Human Resources, the
Court described how the nature of the legal relationship changes between parties
in the context of such judicial decrees. 383 In its holding, the Court reasoned that
"court-ordered consent decrees create [a] 'material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties."'384 Justices Scalia and Thomas opine in their
concurrence that consent decrees provide "some basis" for classifying "the party
favored by the settlement or decree" as the prevailing party.385 For that reason,
the disavowal of liability by municipal governments serves a very limited
purpose in the context of consent decrees.
The right to collectively bargain does not bleed into topics reserved for the
determination of management. 386 State statutes codifying the public employees'
right to collectively bargain implicitly recognize that constitutional rights cannot
be forsaken because of collective bargaining provisions.38 7 And while the
collective bargaining agreements have been generally viewed by some as simply
providing additional employment rights to the respective employees, a lessrecognized-and perhaps unintended consequence-is that they can infringe
upon the rights of the general public. 388
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the illogical assertion that the police's
collective bargaining rights take precedent over reform efforts. In Jurcisin v.
Cuyahoga County BoardofElections, the local police union in Cleveland sought

382. The absence of such input highlights the imbalance that exists with regard to the
consideration of interests and concerns. There is an assumption that elected officials represent
the viewpoints of their respective communities by sheer virtue of being duly elected. The belief
that civilians should simply use the ballot box as the sole avenue to express their support or
disdain for the acts of local government officials is problematic. First, it assumes that local
elections involve more substance and accountability to the public than they do. See generally
Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE. L.J. 1191, 1206 (2017) (discussing the
need to democratize union negotiations and proposing the use of notice-and-comment
processes); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, DemocraticPolicing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1827 (2015) (exploring the need for something akin to an administrative rulemaking process
that includes a public comment period time as local officials create policies for police
departments). Such efforts would create a more democratic process by allowing the public to
engage and offer their perspective on matters related to policing.

383. 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001).
384.

Id. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers v. GarlandIndep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,

792-93 (1989)).
385.

Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).

386.

5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2017); 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a).

387. And others expressly identify constitutional matters as legal issues excluded from
taking a subordinated position to collective bargaining rights. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 4117.10(A) (West 2015); Act of June 24, 2004, ch. 69, sec. 5, 2004 Cal. Stat. § 3517.69(b).
388.

Rushin, supra note 382.
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to block the passage of a charter provision creating a civilian police review board
389
The court
following high-profile instances of police misconduct in that city.
found that instances of police misconduct and the implementation of disciplinary
procedures to address that misconduct fall outside of the "wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment" covered under Ohio's collective bargaining
statute. 390 The concurring opinion highlighted the language of the relevant state
statute that explicitly provides "laws pertaining to civil rights . . prevail over
conflicting provisions of agreements between employee organizations and public
employers." 391
Critics of structural reform litigation do, however, make a point that is worth
exploring: efforts to change the practices of governmental institutions and
agencies often require extensive court involvement and time.3 92 The subject
matter and detailed substantive work involved requires resources and a level of
complex case management that cannot be resolved quickly. Reform efforts
involve the extensive revision of policies, procedures and practices in order to
create the organizational structure and cultural shift necessary to achieve the
required goal. 393 The result is a multi-year process. In police reform litigation,
that crucial time cannot be squandered by attempts to circumvent reform efforts.
Looking forward, two solutions should be considered to avoid the creation
of apparent conflicts between structural reform efforts and collective bargaining
agreements. The first solution offered pertains to the judicial analysis and rulings
on police union motions to intervene. Federal courts overseeing the
implementation of remedial police reforms should be reticent to permit unions to
intervene. Unions seeking to intervene in the litigation should not be permitted
to use the "other conditions of employment" phrase as the basis for inserting their
bargaining demands into the reform process. Courts should resist the urge to
liberally apply the right of intervention standard for two reasons. The collective
bargaining concerns of unions around consent decrees have largely centered on
use-of-force and discipline policies. These policy revisions are designed to
protect the public from excessive force and to appropriately hold officers

389. 35 Ohio St. 3d 137, 137-39 (Ohio 1988); see also Cleveland v. Lester, 143 Ohio
Misc. 2d 39, 40 (2007); Ronnie A. Dunn, The Cleveland Police Review Board: An
Examinationof Citizen Complaints and Complainants'Experiencewith the Citizen Complaint
Process 8, https:/perma.cc/WY5Z-BJYG (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
390. Jurcisin,35 Ohio St. 3d at 145.
391. Id. at 147 (Wright, J., concurring) (quoting OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.10 (West
2015)).
392. See generally Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional
Reform Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REv. 167 (2017) (exploring the issues faced with winding
down injunctions ordered in institutional reform litigation that have lasted for as long as forty
years).
393. Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 16 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615,622-28 (2016) (identifying factors that make governing
police departments difficult. They include: "the [c]ultural [t]radition of [d]eference to
the[p]olice" and "[s]erving the [m]ajority" at the expense of the minority.).
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accountable for misconduct. Bargaining provisions and demands on these topics
have rightfully been identified as impediments to reforms designed to deliver
constitutional policing. Permitting union intervention on the specious basis that
they have a significant interest in the litigation only further delays the
implementation of constitutional police policies and practices.
Courts overseeing the implementation of reform efforts should do so with
keen focus on the purported rights in question when deciding the merits of police
union motions to intervene. The law supporting collective bargaining rights is
firmly rooted in ensuring the members can negotiate on issues related to wages,
hours and other conditions of employment.394 The power of unions organized to
protect the labor interests of law enforcement officers has surged over the last
forty years. 395 And while protecting worker rights is essential, all efforts should
be made to ensure that the constitutional protections guaranteed to all individuals
do not take a back seat to the preferences of organized employee groups.
The phrase "other conditions of employment" should not be viewed as an
opening for law enforcement members to use remedies devised to redress
unconstitutional policing as an opportunity to negotiate for higher pay or to
stymie reform efforts that they believe unfairly malign their reputational interests
and authority. As discussed above, managerial interests of employers are not
subject to union bargaining. 396 As the court in San Jose recognized, 397 the
important balance required in the implementation of police reform efforts aimed
at protecting individuals from unconstitutional threats to their life and liberty
while ensuring officer safety should not be left to the uncertain and varied issues
present at the negotiation table. By its very nature, the bargaining process is rife
with demands, exchanges, and concessions. It is generally recognized that
neither party walks away with everything that they hoped to secure. That is not
an appropriate venue for developing policies and procedures aimed at ensuring
respective localities meet their obligation to deliver constitutional policing.
For too long, the federal judiciary has gone to great lengths to avoid its
responsibility of upholding the constitutional rights of communities harmed by
police brutality.398 It has asserted federalism and standing to avoid using its
power and authority to address abusive police tactics on a structural level.3 99
Indeed, the relentless constitutional violations have been committed under the
watchful eye and affirming voice of the courts. The passage of § 12601 has

Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most
394.
Important Areas of American Policing, in POLICE REFORM FROM THE BorroM UP: OFFICERS
AND THEIR UNIONS As AGENTS OF CHANGE 89 (Monique Marks & David Sklansky eds., 2012)
(arguing that employees have a fundamental right to organize over work terms and conditions).
395. Id.
396. Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State Public
Employment Labor Relations, 84 A.L.R.3d 242, at II § 3[a] (2018).

397.

San Jose Peace Officer's Ass'n v. San Jose, 78 Cal. App. 3d 935, 948-49 (1978).

398.

See supraPart II.

399.

See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377-78 (1976).
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granted the federal judiciary undeniable oversight to address and remedy
systemic police abuses. It took more than a century for the law to be passed.
Those communities on the brink of receiving relief should not be waylaid for the
sake of purported collective bargaining rights. We know that lives have been lost
while details related to motions to intervene have been negotiated between the
400
parties and police unions.
Decisions made by city officials to comply with the requirements of
constitutional policing cannot and should not be the subject of contract
negotiations with unions. Attempts by unions to intervene on such a specious
basis also demonstrates the need for clear and unambiguous local and state laws.
The second solution pertains to state labor laws. Local governments should
pass legislation to codify their exclusive authority, especially as it relates to
remedying officer misconduct. That legislation would unequivocally leave
policy decisions on use of force and police accountability to government officials
elected and selected to manage such decisions. Doing so would expressly remove
those topics from the possible issues subject to collective bargaining and lay the
responsibility for such decisions squarely at the feet of the mayor and the chief

of police.
Collective bargaining rights do not extend to all facets of decision-making
in policing. Though the majority of states permit law enforcement personnel to
organize and negotiate over terms of their employment, those negotiable terms
do not generally include managerial decisions. Determining the most effective
means for law enforcement to observe and protect the constitutional rights of
individuals is the role of municipal government, specifically of those either
elected or selected to manage that governmental function. Decisions regarding
the appropriate and justifiable use of force-including the amount, timing and
type-under the Constitution is a core function for government. It is illogical to
allow police interest groups to impede remedial efforts when local government
fails at the essential function of protecting the constitutional rights of its citizens.
The same is true of the need for government to set policies aimed at holding
officers accountable for instances of misconduct. There is undoubtedly a delicate
balance to be made between providing officers with adequate due process during
internal investigations and ensuring that the discipline process holds officers
accountable for misdeeds. That accountability must be fair, effective, timely, and
tailored to the expectations of the community. Striking the necessary balance of
these considerations should not be left to contract negotiations with union
officials. Indeed, it is difficult to come up with another situation or context that
provides potential wrongdoers with the ability to negotiate the process and the
extent of their punishment.
While police unions are powerful political entities, collective bargaining

400.

Aimee Green, 'Groundbreaking'Settlement on PortlandPolice Use of Excessive

Force Draws Praise, Disappointment, OREGONIAN (Aug. 29, 2014), http://perma.cc/YH67TCFY.
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agreements were never intended to contravene the protections afforded by the
U.S. Constitution. Over time, however, the scope and practical assertion of those
rights have permitted union interests to reach far outside their intended sphere.
Indeed, permitting these privately negotiated agreements to include provisions
related to police accountability and use-of-force investigations has great
potential to infringe on the constitutional rights of the larger public, which all
government entities are obligated to uphold. The rights of members of the larger
public-who are not party to the agreement-should not be negotiated away at
the bargaining table by those involved in structural reform litigation and
obligated to meet those settlement terms.

